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Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age? 
 
 
Achilles is not quite invulnerable; the sacred waters did not wash the heel by which Thetis held 
him. Siegfried, in the Nibelungen, is not quite immortal, for a leaf fell on his back whilst he was 
bathing in the dragon’s blood, and that spot which it covered is mortal. There is a crack in 
everything God has made. 
-Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Compensation” 
   
  
This thesis records a twofold effort to argue, first, for the possibility of metaphysics after the so-
called “overcoming” of metaphysics and, second, to show how in the work of William Desmond 
we find a viable form of metaphysics. First, though, a bit of an introduction to the central figure. 
Born in Cork, Ireland, in 1951, William Desmond describes himself as having grown up in the 
Middle Ages, “an Irish Catholic, fostered on a sense of the mystery of God and God’s ways, on a 
sympathy for the rejected and the outside whom we cannot judge not to be God’s favored, 
fostered, too, on an esteem that God’s creation, nature, was good.”1 At an early age Desmond fell 
in love with poetry, especially Wordsworth, and later took a great interest in the works of 
Shakespeare. After a year spent in the Dominican novitiate, he enrolled at University College 
Cork where he eventually focused his studies on English and Philosophy. After earning an MA 
in philosophy, with a focus on Collingwood’s aesthetics, he moved to America where he earned 
a PhD in philosophy at Penn State University. After completing his PhD, Desmond taught at St 
Bonaventure for one year (1978-79) before returning to Ireland with the intention of making his 
home there. This was not to be: three years later, he returned to America to teach at Loyola 
University in Baltimore (1982-94). In 1994, he again crossed the Atlantic to take a position at the 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, where he taught until retiring in 2017.  
                                               
1 William Desmond, Perplexity and Ultimacy (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 2.  
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Befitting one fêted as “Ireland’s most distinguished living philosopher,”2 Desmond’s 
work engages an array of thinkers – Heraclitus to Hegel, Plato to Nietzsche – and topics ranging 
from metaphysics to ethics to aesthetics to religion. His interlocutors include Richard Kearney, 
Cyril O’Regan, John Caputo, and a growing body of students who write appreciatively of his 
wisdom and generosity. Not least among these is Christopher Ben Simpson whose work has 
gone a long way in making Desmond’s thought more widely known.3 Finally, two of his 
monographs have been the focus of special issues of journals4 and two volumes of essays 
inspired by his thought are now available.5  
In the introduction to Between System and Poetics, Anthony Kelly describes Desmond’s 
ambition: “Desmond sees it as his task to find an adequate place for genuine alterity, the other 
which is nevertheless not alien to revitalize the transcendent and to show its ineluctability for the 
ontological constitution of the human and of any understanding of the human which can lay 
claim to adequacy.”6  A daunting task, to be sure, seeing as Desmond’s philosophy is incorrigibly 
metaphysical in character and, he admits, “metaphysics is a word not in good odor in some 
quarters today.”7 Yet, Richard Kearney observes, Desmond has always had a skeptical eye for 
the fast and quick, for cheap notions of the destruction of metaphysics when not properly 
understood or when used as an excuse to ignore the rich complexity of the Western 
philosophy of Being, as if one could just sweep it aside and begin all over again from 
scratch, from the ground zero of our transcendental egos.8   
 
                                               
2 Thomas Kelly, “Introduction” to Between System and Poetics (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1.  
3 Christopher Ben Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern (Bloomington: IUP, 2009); The William  
Desmond Reader (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012) 
4 Ethics and the Between was the focus of Ethical Perspectives 8 (2001) 4, 231-331. God and the Between  was  
addressed in Louvain Studies 36 (2012) 2-3, 219—317.  
5 In addition to Between System and Poetics there is William Desmond and Contemporary Theology eds., 
 Christopher Ben Simpson and Brendan Thomas Sammon (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2017). 
6 Kelly, “Introduction,” 3. 
7 William Desmond, “The Porosity of Being,” in Renewing the Church in a Secular Age, 287.  
8 Richard Kearney, “Two Thinks at a Distance,” in The William Desmond Reader ed. Christopher Ben  
Simpson (Albany: SUNY, 2012), 237.  
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Kearney aptly likens Desmond to the solitary marathoner, a thinker in for the long haul. This 
seems apt, given the request Desmond makes of would-be readers:  
I do not ask for uncritical readers, but I do ask for disciplined readers – reader who have 
studied hard and long, who can take their time to think; readers who have not shunned 
solitude; readers suspicious of themselves before being suspicious of others; readers 
patient when demands are made on them; readers themselves adventurers; readers who 
ask for more than the rhetorics fashionable in academic philosophy, and who hate the 
substitution of “relevant” ideology for the seriousness of truth…9  
 
Desmond’s philosophy, as will become apparent, offers no shortcuts and cannot be traversed 
quickly. A decision to take up his work requires one investing one’s whole self and allowing 
oneself to be formed as one reads. This is philosophy as askesis or an exercise aimed not at a 
new thought but at cultivating a renewed mode of mindfulness attentive to the disclosures of the 
divine in in the everyday. 
Those familiar with the mood of contemporary philosophy, however, may feel reluctant 
to accept this invitation. Per his olfactory allusion, Desmond admits: 
 I know that metaphysics is a word not in good odor in some quarters today, 
 whether among some technical virtuosi of the analytical persuasion, or among the 
 hermeneutical mandarins of the Continental persuasion, to say nothing of the 
 dithyrambic textualists among the deconstructionists.10 
 
An “unrepentant” metaphysician, Desmond still insists we “need to ask the question of being; we 
need to ask the question of human being; we need to ask the question of the being of God.”11 One 
wonders: is this the wish of a philosopher too stubborn to accept metaphysics’ overcoming? 
Clearly, Desmond has not read John Manoussakis’s essay which begins, “William Desmond is 
arguably in our times the last metaphysician.”12 
                                               
9 William Desmond, Being and the Between (Albany: SUNY, 1995), xvi.  
10 William Desmond, “The Porosity of Being,” 287.  
11 Ibid.  
12 John Manoussakis, “The Silences of the Between,” in William Desmond and Contemporary Theology  
269.  
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 The “last metaphysician”? Mayhap he is. Or mayhap not: Desmond, in my estimation, is 
a pioneer who has launched an entirely new form of metaphysical reflection. Before I can make 
this case, however, a certain amount of terrain surveying must be done. To argue for the viability 
of Desmond’s approach to metaphysics, I need first to canvas the various critiques of 
metaphysics as found in the works of Martin Heidegger, John Caputo, Richard Kearney, and 
Merold Westphal. Of course, other figures could and should have been engaged: Jean-Luc 
Marion, Emmanuel Falque, and Kevin Hector all have interesting things to say about 
metaphysics and its purported overcoming. Indeed, each of the authors I selected could be treated 
singly and at great length. My choices owe as much to my competence (meager as this may be) 
as to my biography: I spend more time reading these figures than I have others and, in the case of 
Westphal and Kearney, I have had the privilege of being taught by them.  
  In this chapter, I want to take seriously the critique of metaphysics made by Heidegger, 
Caputo, Kearney, and Westphal. My tactic may appear odd. For is not my goal to “take down” 
any thinker or to show why his critique wrongheaded. I am not looking to incapacitate the foes of 
metaphysics! On the contrary, I want to take seriously what they say in order to generate a series 
of “rules” or “commandments” a metaphysics worthy of theological engagement must obey. My 
goal is to consider how each critic brings to light inconsistencies, contradictions, and missteps 
that have hampered earlier attempts at metaphysics. By taking these critiques to heart, I hope to 
show how critique can work to capacitate a viable form of metaphysics. Each of our critics is 
right to level a “justified refusal of what is not to be affirmed,” but while each “no” forecloses an 
earlier effort at metaphysics, this does not necessarily mean the “no” forecloses all future efforts. 
Indeed, the salutary “no” of skepticism, as William Desmond writes,  
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grows out of the presentiment that there is a norm or ideal that is short-changed or 
betrayed…the “no” of genuine skepticism is the overt expression of something more 
deeply recessed – something not just a matter of negation.13 
 
A capacitating approach permits us to see how critique proves error-reducing. The “no” of 
critique affirms by recognizing absence and each critic identifies “something that is missing” in 
earlier practices of metaphysics. Indeed, this is a crucial task of metaphysics: as we will see, the 
absence metaxology remains mindful of is not an empty nihil but, rather, what Desmond calls a 
“fecund void.”14  Thinking along with these critics leads me to propose five “commandments” to 
be obeyed by any metaphysics wishing to be considered a resource for theological reflection.   
 In Chapter Two, I provide an introduction to Desmond’s systematic metaphysics. I stress 
systematic because he maintains, “one can reflect systematically without necessarily claiming 
possession of the system in the closed and totalizing sense.”15 Metaphysics needs to think with 
categories but its task cannot be delimited by its categories; metaphysicians must remain always 
“mindful of what exceeds system.”16 Hewing closely to Christopher Ben Simpson’s schema, I 
orient the reader to Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics and the key concepts essential for 
understanding his project. I try throughout to draw attention to points of overlap between 
Desmond’s project and Charles Taylor’s and I show how Desmond’s work can serve to enrich 
Taylor’s account of our secular age.  
 I conclude the second chapter by considering how Desmond’s philosophy functions to 
inculcate a style of metaxological mindfulness. Metaphysics does not offer, at least as Desmond 
practices, a disengaged description of being. We are implicated in the happening of being and 
metaphysics reflects our effort to account for what it means “to be” caught up in the midst of 
                                               
13 William Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being, 101.  
14 Desmond, The Intimate Universal, 147.  
15 Kelly, Between System and Poetics, 20.  
16 Desmond, God and the Between (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 10.  
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things. Desmond, like Taylor, tries to tell us our story in a way that gives us to perceive what it 
means “to be” anew. Here we see how Desmond complements and deepens Taylor’s map by 
bringing to the surface otherwise recessed resources. Metaxology, we may come to appreciate, is 
not simply a method of thinking philosophically; it offers itself as a “practice of a way of life.”17 
I conclude this thesis with three summative points. First, I re-affirm the viability of 
Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics by showing how augments the map Taylor draws of our 
secular age. Second, and more playfully, I offer a metaxological reading of the line, “there is a 
crack in everything God has made.” So read, the “crack” is no tragic flaw but a graced opening 
exposing “the deepest ontological intimacy of our being.”18 Finally, I lead us into a pub where I 
dub Desmond the metaphysician of the “crack” and ask how his understanding of metaphysics 
makes it possible to read metaxology as a form of spiritual exercise.  
 
1.0 Contesting Metaphysics: Between Knockers and Boosters  
 It is common coin among philosophers and theologians that metaphysics and 
ontotheology are synonymous. Surely Iain Thomson is not alone in believing that “Heidegger’s 
Destruktion of the metaphysical tradition leads him to the view that all Western metaphysical 
systems make foundational claims best understood as ‘ontotheological’.” Yet, even in 
Heidegger’s own writings,19 the equation of metaphysics and ontotheology demands nuance. 
John Betz, following Cyril O’Regan, asks whether Heidegger has “forgotten or misremembered 
something?”20 Might it be possible that his description of metaphysics as ontotheology too-
                                               
17 Ibid., 184.  
18 Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being, 13.  
19 Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” in Identity and Difference  
trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969).  
20 John Betz, “Overcoming the Forgetfulness of Metaphysics,” in William Desmond and Contemporary  
Theology, 67.  
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cavalierly lumps together all practices of metaphysics, from Plato to Aquinas to Hegel to 
Desmond? Betz fears this to be the case: “Unfortunately, under Heidegger’s solvent influence, 
all these colors bleed into one.”21 So while it is right for Heidegger, Caputo, Kearney, and 
Westphal to reject ontotheology, this rejection may not necessarily require a wholesale 
jettisoning of metaphysics. On the contrary, a consideration of each of their positions may 
actually exhibit how these thinkers offer a range of stances. Rather than a binary either/or, 
metaphysics can admit a range of knockers, boosters, and those in-between. 
1.1 Martin Heidegger 
 We get to the heart of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as “ontotheology” with his 
question, “How does the deity enter into philosophy?”22 He answers: 
assuming that philosophy, as thinking, is the free and spontaneous self- involvement 
with beings as such, then the deity can come into philosophy only  insofar as philosophy, 
of its own accord and by its own nature, requires and  determines that and how the 
deity enters into it.23  
 
For Heidegger, the god of ontotheology does not irrupt freely into the human order: this is not 
the theophanic deity of the Burning Bush or Jesus’ Baptism and Transfiguration. The god of 
metaphysics, rather, has been dragooned into philosophy and put at its service. Philosophy, as it 
were, writes the job description and employs god in a narrowly circumscribed position. This is a 
longstanding problem because Western metaphysics 
since its beginning with the Greeks has eminently been both ontology and theology, still 
without being tied to these rubrics. For this reason my inaugural lecture What is 
Metaphysics? (1929) defines metaphysics as the question about beings as such and as a 
whole. The wholeness of this whole is the unity of all beings that unifies as the generative 
ground.24  
 
                                               
21 Ibid.  
22 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 55.  
23 Ibid., 56. Emphasis added.  
24 Ibid., 54.  
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In the final sentence, we can recognize Aristotelian and Hegelian metaphysics as prime culprits 
of “ontotheology” as their philosophy aims at giving an account, a logos, of beings that includes 
theos as subtending the whole. The god comes into metaphysics, not as the wholly other, but to 
serve as the divine glue binding all beings (ontos) together.  
 The god of metaphysics, then, proves a functional god who acts as the “causa prima that 
corresponds to the reason-giving path back to the ultima ratio, the final accounting.”25 This god 
is implicated within creation and placed at its service. Evoking Pascal’s critique of the god of the 
philosophers, Heidegger claims causa sui is 
the right name for the god of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. 
Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and 
dance before this god.26   
 
It would be better, as he sees it, to abandon “god as causa sui” and to step back out of 
metaphysics where a “god-less thinking” may prove to be more open to the advent of the true 
God “than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.”27 One may be better equipped to think the Holy 
Other by resisting efforts to reduce the Divine to the immanent realm.  
 What Heidegger rejects, D.C. Schindler observes, is the “absorption of theology into 
philosophy.”28 Yet, as Merold Westphal notes, this critique does not hit all metaphysicians. “It is 
not always sufficiently noticed that his paradigms are Aristotle and Hegel and that the target of 
his analysis of ‘the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics’ is a tradition that stretches 
from Anaximander to Nietzsche, which isn’t quite the same as the tradition that stretches from 
Augustine to Kierkegaard.” 29 Heidegger’s atheism is less an outright denial of God à la 
                                               
25 Ibid., 60.  
26 Ibid., 72. 
27 Ibid. 
28 D.C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 237. 
29 Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology (New York: Fordham Press, 2001), 257.  
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Nietzsche than a methodological decision to dislodge the god co-opted by a certain strand of 
metaphysics. In this, Heidegger enacts a repetition of Kant’s “I have found it necessary to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith.”30  
 Accordingly, claims that Heidegger “overcomes” metaphysics need to be finessed. 
Certainly, he overcomes a type of metaphysics, one that incorporates god into its system as an 
explanatory cause, a “cog” in the machine. Such metaphysics, as ontotheology, obviates the 
distinction between Being and beings; it inscribes god and beings within the same framework 
and tasks god with making “the whole of reality intelligible or transparent to human 
understanding.”31 Evacuated from this picture is any sense of mystery because “in the light of a 
cause-effect coherence, even God, for representational thinking, can lose all that is exalted and 
holy, can sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficiens.”32 Heidegger’s justified refusal is 
directed toward a metaphysics that denudes being of wonder and sacrality.  
 Westphal succinctly and helpfully summarizes Heidegger’s critique:  
1. Onto-theology is calculative thinking 
2. Onto-theology is representational thinking 
3. Onto-theology is bad theology33 
 
These share a common root: a “rationalist demand for total intelligibility.”34 Onto-theo-logy turns 
the biblical God into a god, a being among beings, invoked only to hold the system together and 
to “make sense” of the whole. But it would be too hasty to interpret Heidegger’s advocacy for a 
god-less thinking as a summons to, or warrant for, outright atheism. Even if he demonstrates 
                                               
30 Merold Westphal, “The Importance of Overcoming Metaphysics for the Life of Faith,” Modern  
Theology 23:2 (April 2007), 263.  
31 Ibid., 262.  
32 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings ed., David Krell (San 
 Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 331.  
33 Merold Westphal, Transcendence and Self-Transcendence (Bloomington: IUP, 2004), 19.  
34 Ibid. 
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little personal interest in theology, his “overcoming” of metaphysics as ontotheology can be read 
as a salutary effort that chastens the pretense of human reason in its effort to corral the divine. 
 Let me conclude by articulating a first “Commandment” for a theological engagement 
with metaphysics. Inspired by Heidegger: Thou Shalt Not Index the Divine to Human Reason. 
Even if often interpreted as a hostile “knocker,” a nuanced reading of Heidegger recognizes that 
his critique does not apply universally to metaphysics. His “no” to ontotheology can be read as 
pointing to something recessed, something in need of being drawn out by an adequate 
metaphysics. A metaphysics capable of interacting with theology (1) cannot set a priori terms for 
God’s arrival and (2) cannot invoke god to “make sense” of the whole or to render the whole 
transparent to human reason.  
 
1.2 John Caputo 
 Christopher Ben Simpson summarizes Caputo’s “problem” with metaphysics as follows: 
“Metaphysics is not faithful to life insofar as it is an abstract system that privileges static unity in 
order to provide a stable foundation for life.”35 It is not faithful to life and abstract because it 
offers “eloquent assurances about Being and presence even as factical existence was being tossed 
about by physis and kinesis.”36 Elsewhere, Caputo sharpens this criticism, decrying metaphysics 
for providing a disengaged “account of what is called ‘mind-independent being’, that amounts to 
an account of the way things are when we are not there.”37 If metaphysics wants to study the 
“really real,” then “physics is all the metaphysics we’re ever going to get.”38 His advice to an 
aspiring metaphysician stings: “brush up on your ‘superstring field theory’ or whatever will 
                                               
35 Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern, 7.  
36 John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 3.  
37 John Caputo, The Insistence of God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 113.  
38 Ibid., 191.  
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supersede superstrings next week.”39 Metaphysics has been supplanted by physics: better, then, 
to bone up on math than to waste oneself speculating on being and substance.  
 Metaphysics, he continues, privileges a static unity that claims to provide a stable 
foundation for life. For him, neither religion nor metaphysics can lay claim to a perspicuous 
viewpoint or unassailable foundation on which to stand. Metaphysics, like religion, “is a human 
practice…always deconstructible in the light of the love of God, which is not deconstructible.”40 
Metaphysics, in other words, purports to provide the “system” in which all things fit and in 
which the flux is controlled. But in its attempt to measure and manage the vicissitudes of daily 
life, metaphysics betrays by removing us from the flux.41 
 Finally, lest any doubts linger about Caputo’s feelings, he writes with brio  
 I do not embrace a naturalist metaphysics, no more than I embrace a  supernaturalist 
metaphysics. I resist every embrace of metaphysics. When it  comes to embraces, I vastly 
prefer flesh and blood (which is my materialism).42  
 
Having sworn off metaphysics, Caputo offers instead his “radical hermeneutics.” This approach, 
he avers, stays with the difficulty of life, avoids the “easy assurances of metaphysics,” and 
“pushes itself to the brink and writes philosophy from the edge.”43 
 The hot vehemence Caputo directs against metaphysics leads him to proffer what he calls 
a “cold hermeneutics” that does not believe in  
“Truth” – it renounces all such capitalization – something hidden by and stored up in a 
tradition which is groaning to deliver it to us. It has lost its innocence about that and is 
tossed about by the flux, by the play, by the slippage. It understands that meaning is an 
effect…Just when the metaphysics of presence is about to convince us that being clings 
to being, that truth is a well-rounded whole, a hermeneutical or eschatological circle, cold 
hermeneutics opens up an abyss.44  
                                               
39 Ibid., 192.  
40 John Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), 113.  
41 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 1.  
42 Caputo, The Insistence of God, 191.  
43 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 3.  
44 Ibid., 189.  
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Caputo desires to remain faithful to the messiness of the quotidian, to remain in the flux rather 
than seeking a back door out of it. There is, moreover, a Heideggerian trace in Caputo’s denial of 
a “Truth” that can be systematized or controlled. There exists no privileged access to, or 
possession of, the Truth; one cannot claim any Archimedean point that affords an uninhibited or 
disengaged view. 
 We can see in Caputo, furthermore, a link between his claim that “meaning is an effect” 
and his understanding of God. “The meaning of God is enacted in these multiple movements of 
love, but these movements are simply too multiple, too polyvalent, too irreducible, too 
uncontainable to identify, to define, or determine.”45 God is not “the Truth” arrived at through 
disengaged speculation, nor is God the object of privileged propositions guarded by magisterial 
authority. God, for Caputo, “is not only a name but an injunction, an invitation, a solicitation, to 
commend, to let all things be commended, to God.”46 The meaning of “God” is not arrived at 
through disengaged speculation but through action; it is enacted in “openness to a future that I 
can neither master nor see coming.”47 True religion comes not from acquiring knowledge or 
infallible propositions but is lived as a “restlessness with the real that involves risking your 
neck.”48 God comes to us as a question, not an answer, and we enact religion as our response.  
 This suggests two further commandments. 2nd Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be 
Faithless to the Flux. 3rd Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Produce Counterfeit Gods.  
 2nd Commandment: If we hope to allay Caputo’s concerns about metaphysics, it seems 
that it must give a faithful account of the flux of the everyday. This means it must account for 
                                               
45 Caputo, On Religion, 140.  
46 Ibid., 141. 
47 Ibid., 139.  
48 Ibid., 114.  
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concrete lived reality while remaining attentive to the inherent fragility of existence. Within the 
quotidian, furthermore, there is an ethical summons to fidelity to the Other beyond codified 
obligation. Metaphysics cannot only not evade the flux but must also inform an ethic of “risking 
one’s neck” for one’s neighbor.  
 3rd Commandment: if we have any desire to claim to have knowledge of the Absolute, we 
must foreswear absolute knowledge. We cannot pretend to have privileged access to, or an 
infallible knowledge of, Truth. Knowledge of God arises indirectly, amidst the flux, as we are 
moved by metaphors and “thrown above” by hyperboles (hyper + ballein) toward an encounter 
with God. The God of metaphysics cannot be one we craft as an idol; a God worthy of the name 
is not a god conjured from our own resources. A praiseworthy God arrives unbidden, 
unexpectedly, and catches us off guard.  
 
1.3 Richard Kearney 
 At first blush, Richard Kearney might appear more comfortable being grouped among the 
knockers. He writes, for instance, that 
for too long theology and metaphysics have identified the divine with the most all-
powerful of Beings. Sovereign, Self-sufficient substances. Transcendental Forms. First 
and Final Causes. Immutable essences.49  
 
And, with Paul Ricoeur, he observes  
without the encounter of Greek metaphysics with biblical religious thought, philosophers 
“would have never reached the idea that Being is the proper name of God and that this 
name designates God’s very essence.”…this conjunction of God and Being was to 
survive for many centuries – from Bonaventure and Aquinas to Gilson and the neo-
Scholastics. Thus did the God of Exodus secure ontological tenure in the God of 
metaphysics.50  
 
                                               
49 Richard Kearney, “Epiphanies of the Everyday: Toward a Micro-Eschatology,” in After God, ed. John  
Manoussakis (New York: Fordham, 2006), 11.  
50 Richard Kearney, The God Who May Be (Bloomington: IUP, 2001), 24.  
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Like Heidegger before him, Kearney regards God’s cooption into metaphysics as ontotheology’s 
key transgression because of its “tendency to reify God by reducing Him to a being (Seinde) – 
albeit the highest, first, and most indeterminate of all beings.”51   
 When Nietzsche and Freud trumpet God’s death, Kearney once again agrees with 
Ricoeur: the death of god they celebrate is the false god of ontotheology, the god who “who 
deserves to die.”52 After the atrocities of the Shoah 
so dies the omnipotent God of ontotheology understood as Emperor of the World. So also 
dies the omniscient God of “self-sufficient knowledge” that places the “powerful over the 
good and law over love and humility that are superior to law.” And along with the 
omnipotent and omniscient God goes the omnipresent God who condones evil as well as 
good. So dies, in short, the Omni-God of theodicy invoked to justify the worst atrocities 
as part of some Ultimate Design.53 
 
One imagines Kearney presiding at the wake of the “Omni-God,” reciting over the casket Etty 
Hillesum’s prayer “You God cannot be God unless we create a dwelling place for you in our 
hearts.”54 We must abandon as otiose the God of “power and might” and risk an encounter with 
the kenotic God of the Incarnation, the one who divests the divine being of omnipotence. The 
God who comes after the death of the God of metaphysics is not the “Highest Being” but, rather, 
the one encountered as a “promise, a call, a desire to love and be loved that can not be at all 
unless we allow God to be God.”55  
 Thus, amidst the rubble of the collapsed “Grand Metaphysical Systems that construed 
God in terms of formal universals and abstract essences,”56 Kearney does not leave us destitute. 
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In fact, he charts amidst the debris a course directed by what he calls “anatheism” as capable of 
opening a space 
where we are free to choose between faith or nonfaith. As such anatheism is about the 
option of retrieved belief. It operates before as well as after the division between theism 
and atheism, and it makes both possible. Anatheism, in short, is an invitation to revisit 
what might be termed a primary scene of religion: the encounter with a radical Stranger 
who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God.57  
 
Kearney’s anatheism does not rest on metaphysical certainties or syllogisms; it makes, instead, a 
wager or “existential drama” calling us to discernment and decision.58 We may return to God; we 
may not. Anatheism is less a command than a coax to openness “to someone or something that 
was lost and forgotten by Western metaphysics.”59 We cannot dance before or sing praises to the 
Omni-God, nor can the God of metaphysics still our restless hearts. Perhaps, though, just perhaps 
the opening of anatheism can lead us to the God who comes after the God of metaphysics, 
enabling us to hear the call of the God who may be, a God who will and wants be God for us…if 
we allow it.  
 In place of the “Grand System,” Kearney privileges what he calls the “micro-
eschatologies” that manifest God in the everyday. For Kearney, the eschaton is not a cataclysmic 
event; it is a “sundering” breaking open and revealing the presence of the divine in the everyday, 
a “sacramental vision” attuned to immanent transcendence.60 Through the concept of micro-
eschatology, Kearney exhorts us to train our eyes not to far-off horizons but to the quotidian 
where we encounter the divine in the mundane, hearing the woo of the Holy in “the least ones 
calling for a cup of cold water, asking to be fed, clothed, cared for, heard, loved.”61 He describes 
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this as a micro-eschatological “fourth reduction” leading us back into the everyday and thrusting 
us into “face-to-face encounters of our ordinary universe” where the divine is disclosed in the 
face of the stranger, where we intuit the presence of the divine amidst St. Teresa’s pots and pans.  
 In his critique of metaphysics as ontotheology, Kearney aligns with Heidegger; in his call 
for us to remain faithful to the quotidian, he stands with Caputo. On his own, he stands without 
parallel as an interpreter of texts. Indeed, Kearney’s diacritical hermeneutics permits him to 
dwell amidst varying genres of writing – poetic, philosophical, theological, and literary – and 
allow their voices to intermingle. He does not merely write about texts but philosophizes through 
them in a way that reveals otherwise concealed resources. His hermeneutical phenomenology, 
moreover, extends beyond texts toward a hermeneutic of lived existence. He offers, for instance, 
“a number of more personal reflections on the enigma of transfiguration, as it relates to the 
specifically paschal testimonies of the resurrected Christ.”62 He writes 
The post-paschal stories of the transfiguring persona remind us that the Kingdom is given 
to hapless fishermen and spurned women, to those lost and wandering on the road from 
Jerusalem to nowhere, to the wounded and weak and hungry, to those who lack and do no 
despair of their lack, to little people “poor in spirit.” The narratives of the transfigured-
resurrected Christ testify that after the long night of fasting and waiting and darkness and 
need – afloat on a wilderness of sea – breakfast is always ready. The transfiguring 
persona signals the ultimate solidarity, indeed indissociability, of spirit and flesh.63  
 
If the God is to be credible after the Shoah, after the death of God, it will be no “Omni-God.” 
The Kingdom’s God speaks “in stories and act of love and justice, the giving to the least of 
creatures, the caring for orphans, widows, and strangers; stories and act which bear testimony – 
as transfiguring gestures do – to that God of little things.”64 The micro-eschatological reduction 
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awakens us to the immanent transcendence of the little things and gives us to behold the world 
with eyes open to the everyday epiphanies of the divine.  
 Hence a 4th Commandment: Thou Shalt Be Attuned and Attentive to Everyday 
Disclosures. A compliant metaphysics will not impose categories but will empower an 
interpretation of the day-to-day attentive to the “small things left behind, unheard and unseen, 
discarded and neglected.”65 It calls for hermeneutical metaphysics that does not pine for a 
different world, but one that makes it possible for us to live in our world differently, attentive to 
“epiphanies of the quotidian” revealing the Divine not in Power and Might but in “mustard 
seeds, grains of yeast, tiny pearls, cups of water.”66   
 
1.4 Merold Westphal 
 I treat Merold Westphal last not only because he is the most hospitable of our thinkers to 
a theological engagement with metaphysics but also, and blessedly, he sets out his own criteria. 
But before I enumerate these and try to formulate his commandment, let me position him vis-à-
vis the other thinkers.  
 Like Heidegger, Caputo, and Kearney, Westphal insists on the need to overcome onto-
theology. And, like Kearney and Caputo, he is committed to a form of hermeneutic 
phenomenology. But compare the following with Caputo’s take on “the Truth” 
the truth is that there is Truth, but in our finitude and falleness we do not have access to 
it. We’ll have to make do with the truths available to us; but that does not mean either 
that we should deny the reality of Truth or that we should abandon the distinction 
between truth and falsity. Moreover, the most we should claim for this claim itself is that 
it is true, that it is the best way for us humans to think about the matter.67    
 
Now recall Kearney’s refusal of the metaphysical traits ascribed to the “Omni-God”: 
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In order to have a biblical, personal, eschatological, and ethical God, the goal Kearney 
and I share, it is necessary to overcome ontotheology. This does not require that we 
abandon abstract and impersonal metaphysical categories in our God talk, but only that 
we put them in their proper, subordinate place.68  
  
We must overcome ontotheology, but this overcoming need not require jettisoning all 
metaphysics. Instead, we need a chastened metaphysics that recognizes (1) the limits of human 
reason and (2) puts metaphysics at the service of faith.  
 In a recent article, Westphal engages Kant, Heidegger, and Marion in an effort to 
understand why “metaphysics is seen as abusing the life of faith by leaving no room for “it.”69 In 
his treatment of Kant, for instance, he detects an apparent paradox:  
We seem to be overcoming metaphysics in order to make room for metaphysics. But 
there is no contradiction here. The metaphysics to be overcome is not the same as the 
metaphysics for which room is made. The one is an enemy of faith, the other is an 
essential component thereof.70  
 
Kant, on Westphal’s reading, resists the encroachment of any dogmatic metaphysics that (1) 
asserts human reason as the “highest tribunal by which all questions of right (quid juris) 
regarding our God talk are to be settled” and (2) reshapes God to “fit the Procrustean bed by 
which it defines human rationality.”71 But, it should be noted, neither this critique, nor those of 
Heidegger or Marion, deal the death stroke to metaphysics. In fact, and quite to the contrary, 
Westphal reads these critiques as having the potential to capacitate a metaphysics that can 
contribute to and serve the life of faith.  
The capacitating power of critique becomes most apparent in the essay’s conclusion. 
Westphal reminds his reader that, up until this point, he has been “focused on overcoming 
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metaphysics, on its danger to the life of faith, its role as abuser of biblical faith.”72 And by 
“overcoming metaphysics” he means the metaphysics that would fall prey to the charge of 
ontotheology. So far, nothing new. Then he writes  
but I have said only three things, and ever so briefly, about the use of metaphysics for the 
life of faith: first, that faith and the theology that accompanies it presuppose and include 
metaphysical beliefs; second, that this metaphysics can be and must be different from the 
metaphysics that needs to be overcome… third, that this metaphysics will need to be a 
humble metaphysics, acknowledging that it rests on faith and not pretending to be the 
Voice of Pure Reason.73  
 
In other words: (1) some type of metaphysics is inescapable; (2) ontotheology will not do; (3) the 
metaphysics needed to serve faith emerges from within faith and cannot proceed as a form of 
disengaged inquiry. Finally, he writes, “the metaphysics that properly belongs to faith, not as its 
ground but as its cognitive content, must be a pragmatic metaphysics.” Such a pragmatic 
metaphysics would “arise out of the practice of faith” and inform “private prayer, character 
formation, public worship, and service to others.” It would be a practice “embedded in a 
spirituality that is simultaneously an inward journey, and upward journey, and an outward 
journey. It is not a preamble to faith but a reflection that arises out of faith and seeks to serve the 
life of faith.”74   
Finally, a 5th Commandment: Be Still and Know: Metaphysics is a Vocation. A 
theologically viable metaphysics will recognize that metaphysics finds its origin as a response to 
something other to it. Rather than a neutral practice of abstract reflection, metaphysics arises 
because of a presentiment that its searching is a consequence of having first been sought and 
called by something anterior to it. The overcoming of metaphysics as ontotheology may, should 
we allow Westphal to play the role of Moses, delivers us from the land of captivity and frees us 
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to take faltering steps out into the Promised Land led by the voice of the One who bids us to 
come. Metaphysics is not a map we draw for ourselves but, rather, the itinerary along which we 
are drawn.  
 
1.5 Capacitating Metaphysics? 
  
 Let me now draw together the “Five Commandments” and indicate how I mean to 
employ them in the next section. Based on the aforementioned critiques, any theologian who 
wishes to engage in metaphysics would be wise to obey the following precepts:   
1. Thou Shalt Not Index the Divine to Human Reason (Heidegger) 
2. Thou Shalt Not Be Faithless to the Flux (Caputo) 
3. Thou Shalt Not Produce Counterfeit Gods (Caputo) 
4. Thou Shalt Be Attuned and Attentive to Everyday Disclosures (Kearney) 
5. Be Still and Know: Metaphysics is a Vocation (Westphal) 
 
Each critic makes, as Desmond might note, a “justified refusal” of previous overreaches by 
metaphysical systems. Yet each “no” need not be read as an embargo on all future endeavors to 
think in a metaphysical key. To the contrary, each offers a corrective negation, a “no” affirming 
an absence, indicating something recessed and in need of being surfaced. These are salutary 
negations that can prove to be capacitating: by pointing out where prior attempts have proved 
fruitless or problematic, each “no” closes off errant pathways and makes it possible for non-
errant efforts to be launched. My task in the next, and rather long, section will be to introduce 
readers to Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics and to show not only how metaxology evades 
the criticisms leveled at earlier practices of metaphysics but also, and more importantly, provides 
a viable resource to theologians who wish to think in a metaphysical register.  
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2.0  Speaking of Metaphysics William Desmond’s Philosophy 
 
 I entitle this section “speaking of metaphysics” because it introduces to the categories and 
vocabulary Desmond uses throughout his philosophy. While there is truth in Catherine 
Pickstock’s claim that “Desmond is astonishingly direct and astonishingly clear,”75 Simpson’s 
observation is equally apt: “Desmond’s work can be complex, dense, meditative, and full of 
neologisms.”76 Thus I begin by considering the nature and task of Desmond’s metaphysics. I then 
take up key categories: “ethos,” the “fourfold way,” and his tripartite understanding of 
transcendence. These furnish our “grammar” for speaking metaphysically, one we will continue 
to build upon and enrich throughout this project. 
 
2.1 Metaxological Metaphysics Defined 
  
Desmond’s Being and Between opens with the primordial metaphysical question: What is 
being? What does it mean to be?77 This is not the question of what it means to be this or that but 
what it means to be at all. A seemingly simple question becomes, upon reflection, maddeningly 
complex; for, as Aristotle noted, “there are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’” (to 
on legetai pollachōs).78 Aristotle and Aquinas, for instance, recognized three ways that being can 
be “said”: the univocal, the equivocal, and the analogical, none of which is capable of giving an 
exhaustive account of being’s meaning. They understood that metaphysics “puts a strain on 
language.”79 This is, though, a necessary and inescapable strain: we cannot but take up the 
question of being because “in all our thinking, and living, certain fundamental senses of being 
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are already at work, and continue to be at work, even when we claim to be ‘postmetaphysical’.”80 
Or, per Westphal, some engagement in metaphysical reflection is unavoidable.  
If Desmond and Westphal are correct, if some type of metaphysics is necessary, we must 
ask: which one? If a theologian wants to make friends with a metaphysician, to whom should she 
turn? There is a range of choices, ranging from Aristotle to Aquinas to Hegel to Badiou. Some of 
them fall afoul of the “Five Commandments” enumerated above: Aristotle and Hegel were, for 
Heidegger, culprits of ontotheology while others, like Badiou, manifest little interest in the God 
question. In my estimation, Desmond is a theologian-friendly metaphysician who harbors no 
aspiration to constructing a grand “system” in which to schematize or explain the whole of being.  
His task, rather, is “to revitalize the transcendent and to show its ineluctability for the ontological 
constitution of the human”81 by awakening his readers to the intimate strangeness of being.  
For Desmond, metaphysics is not an architectonic system but “a form of reflective 
thinking under fidelity to the truth of what is thus at play.”82 The final clause is key: “at play” 
indicates that his philosophy arises in the midst of, and as a reflection upon, finding oneself “in 
the midst of beings.”83 Instead of a disengaged or abstract “answer” to the question of being, 
Desmond’s metaphysics is better thought as a form of mindfulness, a method of reflection 
leading us “along the road” as we plumb the question of being. By remaining faithful to what is 
“at play,” his philosophy originates in, and stays faithful to, everyday flux. This becomes clear if, 
recalling the dual meaning meta (“in the midst” and “beyond”), we follow his suggestion that 
this double sense of “meta” can be taken to correspond to the difference of ontology and 
metaphysics. Ontology (as a logos of to on) can be taken as an exploration of given being 
as immanent; metaphysics can be seen as opening a self-surpassing movement of thought 
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that points us to the porous boundary between immanence and what cannot be 
determined entirely in immanent terms.84  
 
The question of being that arises from dwelling amidst beings (ontology) can spur us into a 
mindfulness of what is in excess of, or beyond, beings (metaphysics). Rather than a denial of the 
quotidian, metaphysics begins amidst the flux and guides us to reflect upon the fact that “all 
beings, events, processes are, or happen to be. That they are at all is something that exceeds what 
they are.”85 Mindful attention to the ordinary proves revelatory of how extraordinary being is. 
 We are in need of this renewed mindfulness because – here Desmond and Taylor align – 
we have lost our sense of wonder at the sheer existence of being. One of the symptoms of the 
“eclipse of the transcendent” in modernity is an “epistemic irritability with the equivocity of 
being” 86 that fuels a rage for imposing order: 
One thinks of the modern mathematization of nature and the hope of empowering 
technological interventions. One thinks of how in the scientific objectification of nature, 
externality is stripped of all its qualitative textures, these being consigned to mere 
secondary qualities…There is an evaporation of the good as defining the teleology of 
being. The good of the whole is no longer there, and in its place we find ontologically 
devalued thereness.87    
 
Like Charles Taylor argues at length throughout A Secular Age, Desmond also detects a shift 
away from appeals to the transcendent and an increasing reliance upon the power of human 
reason. With the rise of modernity, the very nature of metaphysical reflection transforms. What 
had been a festive mindfulness of “enchanted” world, porous to intermediation with the divine, is 
strangled as the passages between the immanent and the transcendent orders became clogged. 
Desmond, responding to Taylor, observes, “the movement to this Western buffered self goes 
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together with the disenchantment of the world and the construction of the immanent frame. This 
construction leads by circuitous ways to default atheism, as I would put it.”88 
 Unlike Taylor, however, Desmond does not respond to this “clogging” by means of a 
counter-narrative. He issues, instead, a call for a “return to the sources of metaphysical 
thinking.”89 He hearkens us to heed Socrates’ words that “this is an experience which is 
characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering (thaumazein): this is where philosophy begins and 
nowhere else.”90 Metaphysical thinking begins, he writes,   
in a primal astonishment. Astonishment itself is primal. It is elemental and irreducible. 
Plato speaks of thaumazein as the pathos of the philosopher. This is sometimes translated 
as wonder and this is not inappropriate. Astonishment, however, captures the sense of 
being rocked back on one’s heels, as it were, by the otherness of being in its givenness. 
Plato says pathos: there is a pathology in metaphysics. There is a suffering, an 
undergoing; there is a patience of being; there is a receiving that is not the production of 
the metaphysician or mind.91  
 
Herein we find a synopsis of what Desmond take to be the nature and task of metaphysics. Its 
nature: metaphysics originates as a response to suffering a “certain shock or bite of otherness.”92 
Metaphysics reflects being opened, both being as opened toward us and our being opened as a 
result of it addressing us. The task of metaphysics, then, is keep alive this astonishment, to 
remain faithful to its vocation to renew the “opening to transcendence that comes first to us.”93 
 So far, Desmond’s metaphysics avoid transgressing our commandments. Whatever the 
cause of astonishment, Desmond recognizes that metaphysics (1) is not self-wrought or projected 
by us, (2) responds to something that exceeds the limit of our speech, thereby requiring a 
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plurivocal attempt to speak of it, (3) induces a mindfulness arising “amidst” the flux, and (4) is a 
vocation responding to the summons of transcendence. Desmond’s, in short, is a searching 
metaphysics that seeks to return to the sources that elicit and refresh our sense of wonder that 
anything is at all.  
 In sum, one must see Desmond’s metaphysics not as a hegemonic “system” but as style 
of philosophical mindfulness reorienting how we dwell amidst beings (meta) in a way making us 
mindful of what is in excess of beings (meta). What Desmond offers in place of a system is a 
systematic approach keen on teasing out the interconnections and inter-mediations occurring 
between beings. If ontotheology inscribes the deity within “the system,” a systematic approach 
provides a mode of inquiry committed to retaining its openness to what cannot be contained by 
the system. This marks a significant counter-move to the modes of mindfulness typically 
associated with modernity, where 
instrumental mind takes for granted, in a potentially mindless way, the beings that are 
given, and goes to work with its categories on what is there, devoid of metaphysical 
astonishment before the that of its being there at all. It bustles with activity, but just this 
its virtue may crowd out an essential otherness. To restore mindfulness of this, one must 
stop thinking in that mode, stop thinking that instrumental thought exhausts the energy of 
thinking. Silence, patience, a different ontological vigilance is needed. Solitude may 
prepare an opening for different thought, for a celebrating mindfulness of being.94   
  
Desmond’s philosophy encourages an “ontological vigilance” mindful of what “instrumental 
mind” brackets out. Metaphysics, as a practice, aims to put us in touch with energies otherwise 
recessed and ignored in modernity. Contemplative receptivity mindfully takes “as granted” the 
beings that are given and, attuned to this gratuity, permits us to dwell anew within what 
Desmond calls the metaxu or ethos of being.   
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2.2 The Ethos of Being: the Metaxu 
 Far from being a disengaged practice, Desmond’s metaphysics is better viewed as a 
response to one’s awakening “in the midst” of beings (meta) and feeling oneself struck into a 
sense of astonishment at being’s very givenness. This astonishment refreshes our sense of what it 
means to be: beings are not neutrally “just there” but are perceived as a part of a dynamic system 
of signs pointing beyond themselves toward their ultimate origin. Desmond’s refusal to separate 
ontology from metaphysics leads him to plead 
for a practice of philosophical thinking that does not float above the ethos of being in 
abstraction, but comes to itself in the midst of things. There the astonishing being given 
of being(s) opens us for thought, and cries out against any form of Laputan abstraction. 
We start in the midst of things, and we are open to ourselves as more reflectively 
thoughtful, we already are in a porosity of being, and are ourselves as this porosity of 
being become mindful of itself.95    
 
Unlike the residents of Swift’s Laputa, the floating island whose residents become lost in 
abstractions and must be struck with a “bladder” to remind them to move, Desmond’s 
metaphysician remains engaged with the happening of being; metaphysics enjoins a practice of 
dwelling amidst beings mindful of a source in excess of being. 
 Having considered the what of metaphysics, we need to consider its whence. Central to 
Desmond’s vision is this insight: metaphysics originates in “the between” or, as found in Plato’s 
Symposium, the metaxu. This is the “ethos” or   
ontological context or overdetermined matrix of value in which our human ethos and 
ethics come to be articulated. This is prior to, and in excess of, every specific ethical 
determination that we define. For we reconfigure the elemental ethos, and so stay true or 
betray or disfigure its promise. What is at play in it cannot be stated univocally or made 
fully evident at the outset, since it is through the reconfigured ethe that we gain some 
sense of its potencies.96  
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Here Desmond indicates a key distinction between the “reconfigured” and “primal” ethos of 
being. In every age, humans dwell and negotiate their lives within the metaxu. What he 
advocates is a “step back” permitting us to look intentionally at our own ethos and to discern 
how our reconfiguration of it reflects, or distorts, the primal ethos. His is an archaeological 
endeavor to peer beneath the practices and values of any particular age, any reconfigured ethos, 
in order to explore “the enabling sources and powers that give being to be as it is, and give it to 
be as good.”97  
 This may become clearer if we connect Desmond’s metaxu or ethos to what Charles 
Taylor describes as the “social imaginary.” The social imaginary is much broader and deeper 
than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in 
a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their 
fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and 
images that underlie these expectations.98  
 
Both Taylor and Desmond emphasize that the social imaginary and metaxu are anterior to 
ourselves. Rather than being a determinate “thing,” it is better to think of each as a matrix or 
encompassing context providing us with the “know how” by which we negotiate our shared 
space. Both reflect the “common understanding which makes possible common practices and a 
widely shared sense of legitimacy”99 expressed in cultural mores, customs, institutions, and 
expectations. But because they operate in the background, we are seldom aware of them – only 
when there is an occurrence of breakdown or an interference with the normal flow of events do 
we become thematically aware of the assumptions informing our practices. I highlight the word 
flow since neither the social imaginary nor the ethos is static. 
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 Social imaginary, however, is not a synonym for metaxu. In my estimation, the social 
imaginary is better situated within the narrower realm ontology whereas the metaxu offers a 
more capacious metaphysical view. As I see it, the social imaginary describes the pre-theoretical 
way humans function and negotiate their lives. It describes this background as the “largely 
unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, within which particular 
features of our world show up for us in the sense they have.”100 These often-unstated assumptions 
inform, shape, and give coherence to our practices: things “make sense” against this horizon. 
Yet, the accent is primarily ontological in describing how “ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social 
surroundings,”101 and live immanently in the midst of other beings.  
 Now, recall Janz’s critique of Taylor: Taylor repeatedly gestures in the direction of 
transcendence, he gives examples of those who have encountered the Transcendent, yet he has 
not demonstrated or given any account for there actually being a transcendent anything. Taylor 
has not, Janz wants to say, demonstrated that there is any there there.102 Sure: Taylor gives us a 
map of our age, but why should we believe any of its routes could lead once again to an 
encounter with God? Why should we trust this map and not, say, a map of Middle Earth or 
Narnia? In short:  mapping of our age says much about being amidst beings but does not point 
beyond itself in an explicit way toward anything beyond being, namely, God. In Desmondian 
terms, Taylor’s map reflects an ontology dealing with being as immanent, being amidst beings. 
Limited to this first sense of meta, Taylor needs of metaphysical supplement to convince the 
seeker – even if via indirections – that the search for the Transcendent is not a snipe hunt.  
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 Herein, I believe, we find where Desmond’s metaxu is capable of making a helpful 
intervention by providing a more robust account of what it means to be in the between. Taylor’s 
genealogy in A Secular Age offers an account of how we came to live and negotiate our lives 
within the “immanent frame” in a way either open or closed to the question of the transcendent. 
It is a richly suggestive ontological/phenomenological portrait of how our “social imaginary” 
came to be formed, what was gained and lost through its formation, and how we ourselves might 
feel anew the “cross-pressures” unsettling us, goading us to ask whether or not we might strike 
out in search of the transcendent. But note: Taylor remains at the level of ontology which can 
take being for granted. Desmond, in his exploration of the metaxu, wants to push readers to 
consider how being must be approached as granted, gratuitous, and wholly unnecessary. So, 
whereas Taylor provides an account of how things came to be as they are, Desmond’s more 
capacious metaphysics poses a more primordial question: why beings are at all?  
Desmond’s explicitly metaphysical inquiry is by no means hostile to A Secular Age. In 
fact, it serves to widen and deepen Taylor’s map. For Desmond, the metaxu encompasses both an 
ontological concern for being amidst beings (first meta) and a metaphysical sense of beings 
pointing us to what is beyond beings (second meta). But we only arrive at the second meta 
through a mindful consideration of the first. Approached as a form of metaphysical reflection, 
metaxology opens mindfulness “to transcendence by means of an exploration of the signs of 
irreducible otherness, even in immanence.”103 As I develop later, this complements Taylor by 
making possible a new way of comporting oneself within our age. Whereas, for Desmond, 
ontology takes being for granted, a metaxological approach awakens a sense of being as 
gratuitously granted and directs our mindfulness beyond beings towards the endowing source.  
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  This endeavor is necessary not only to respond to the critique of Janz but also to respond 
to the “eclipse of the transcendent” we have experienced in modernity. Like Taylor, Desmond 
takes an ambivalent stance toward the developments of instrumental reasoning. Without denying 
the benefits of technology’s advances, he finds within the modern ethos a dual movement of the 
“devaluing objectification of being” and the “subjectification of value.”104 This means: 
Being is objectified in that it is neutralized or devalued or evacuated – emptied of any 
value or worth or goodness in itself – and made into a “merely empirical” mechanism. 
The subjectification of value comes about as there is a “revaluation” of value in terms of 
human self-determination that comes to see the supreme value as freedom understood in 
terms of human autonomy – ultimately flowering to reveal its core in the will to power.105  
 
The dialectic between “objectification of being” and “subjectification of value” is, as Simpson 
notes, reciprocal. Its dialectical movement generates, furthermore, the belief that “humans cannot 
be truly autonomous if there is any value or good other than that which they create.”106 This, for 
Desmond, results in the antinomy between autonomy and transcendence.107 He observes, “The 
antinomy: absolutize autonomy, and you relativize the good as other, or more than our self-
determination; absolutize the good as other and you must relativize autonomy.”108 One thinks 
immediately of Kant, but Hegel and Nietzsche are no less beholden to an antinomy stressing self-
determination and bristling at any semblance of heteronomic interference.  
 This iteration of the modern ethos, however, does not account for the whole story. 
Indeed, an important contribution of deconstruction has been to challenge modernity’s “notion of 
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a fixed univocal unity.”109 Deconstruction destabilizes the sediment of modernity, thereby 
exposing the modern ethos as but one possible figuration. The gain in this insight is in exposing 
how the constructed ethos tries to absorb the giving ethos.110 The ethos of modernity takes itself 
for granted but, in the wake of deconstruction, we see it as an achievement. Instead of rushing to 
reconstruct in the wake of deconstruction, Desmond wants us to perceive the primordial ground 
that manifests such hospitality to our constructions but that resists being exhausted by our 
efforts. We need to learn, that is, to read the signs of the reconfigured ethos that give us a 
glimpse of the primordial ground, the elemental metaxu, as bespeaking its originary source.  
 If the eclipse of the transcendent leads to an etiolated sense of being by limiting it to an 
immanent ontology, Desmond’s task for metaphysics is restorative and therapeutic. That is, he 
conceives metaphysics as enabling us to take a step back from the modern milieu and to ask with 
Peggy Lee, “Is that all there is?” Desmond’s resounding “no” comes by way of a mindfulness 
renewed through a practice of metaphysics which   
is not just the philosophical discipline that examines and evaluates the arguments for their 
rational cogency; not just the philosophical interpretation of the ethos as reconfigured in 
lights of the fundamental notions of a particular era, or people, or particular way of life; 
metaphysics, at its most deep, requires philosophical mindfulness of the primal ethos as 
such.111     
 
From amidst the reconfigured metaxu Desmond desires us to awaken to and become mindful of 
the “intimate strangeness of being.” Strangeness: being has “an otherness, indeed marvel, of 
which we are not the conceptual masters.” Intimate: “this very strangeness allows no stance of 
thinking ‘outside’ being – we are participants in what we think about.”112 A properly attuned 
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metaphysical mindfulness perceives the “crack” in modernity’s shell and permits us to be drawn 
by the intimate strangeness of being as it invites us to behold anew the primal ethos and coaxes 
us to refresh ourselves at the spring of the elemental metaxu where we remember of the good of 
the “to be.”  
 All of this is easier said than done. But Desmond has forbears resisting the neutralization 
or commodification of the metaxu. Of his own ethos, it may be helpful to recall, Gerard Manley 
Hopkins wrote, “…the soil is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.” Clad in our mass-
produced shoes we are now, as then, insulated from the earth and soil; we have lost our taste for 
earth’s sacredness. We live, today, in an era where even to broach the question of the sacred, let 
alone God, can be interpreted as gauche or inappropriate. Ours is a time of what Desmond calls 
“postulatory finitism” which “first supposes, then later presupposes, that the finite and nothing 
but the finite constitutes the ultimate horizon for human thinking, one greater than which none 
can be thought.”113 Postulatory finitism is akin to a deep “sleep of finitude” content to slumber 
without being bothered by talk of the transcendent. From within his own scholarly career he 
recalls “a time when to mention God or religion in the company of advanced intellectuals was 
like mentioning sex in a prudish Victorian drawing room. An icy silence would descend, and the 
silence communicated more than overt argument possibly could: we do not now talk of these 
things.”114 
One way of getting at the theological importance of Desmond’s thought is by recognizing 
him as level a direct challenge to the postulatory finitisim of our age. By attempt to renew 
metaphysical mindfulness by stirring up a sense of astonishment at the gratuity and givenness of 
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being, he aims to re-open the question of the divine. Contrary to Nietzsche’s madman, God is not 
dead. We need, though, to be stirred from the sleep finitude and to dare to encounter the divine 
once more. It is the task and goal of Desmond’s philosophy to lead us on something of a 
purgative itinerary that opens us so that we may come into contact with the Source of creation’s 
beauty on whose account, “nature is never spent” and because of whom in all created beings 
abides “the dearest freshnesss deep down things.”115   
 
2.3 The Fourfold Sense of Being 
 
I pivot now to Desmond’s fourfold – the how of metaxology – by linking the metaxu with 
metaphysics. A neologism, “metaxological philosophy is concerned with a logos of the metaxu, 
or a wording of the between.”116 Our lives, Desmond holds, unfold 
between diverse extremes: birth and death, nothing and infinity, abysses of abjectness and 
superlatives of heights, interiorities of secret intensity and exteriorities of vast extension. 
Human being is a between-being, but more often than not these extremes are recessed in 
the domestication of everyday life.117  
 
Yet metaxological philosophy is not limited to reflecting on human being, for it seeks to discern 
“in the very ontological robustness of immanent otherness an original communication of an even 
more radical otherness, hyperbolic to the terms of immanence alone.”118 This is a searching 
metaphysics, exploring the ethos attentive to disclosures of something in excess of the immanent 
order; it is a philosophy attuned to epiphany, mindful that “what is hyperbolic in immanence 
points to what is hyperbolic to immanence.”119 We cannot abandon the flux because we come to 
mindfulness within it. Our question is not whether to dwell in the ethos, but how: 
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if there is a return to the recalcitrances of given immanence, in their otherness to self-
defining thought, there is also a searching of the “more” of the given world, as charged 
with signs of what exceeds immanence alone. Reading the signs of this “more” as 
communicated in the saturated equivocity of the given world is intimate to the vocation 
of metaxological metaphysics.120  
 
To interpret these signs, we turn to the “fourfold sense of being” to orient us to a practice of 
metaphysics enabling us to recognize the metaxu as a milieu allowing communication with other 
beings and as porous to the creator and sustainer of being itself.  
 Desmond’s “fourfold” engage seriously Aristotle’s observation, “being is said in many 
ways.” The fourfold provides systematic categories for thinking and speaking about being 
without any pretense to being “the system” in which being is schematized or dominated. As both 
systematic and hermeneutic, it “offers itself as an unfolding interpretation of the many sides of 
the plenitude of the happening of being, as manifest to mindfulness in the between.”121 This is a 
fraught undertaking because remaining 
absolutely true to the plenitude of this happening is all but impossible for us, and indeed 
failure of some sort is inevitable. But this impossible truthfulness is asked of us, even if 
inevitable failure brings us back to the truth of our finitude. This failure may itself be a 
success of sorts, in renewing metaphysical astonishment before the enigma of being that 
was, and is, and always will be too much for us, in excess of our groping efforts.122   
 
The inevitable failure of metaphysics to be “absolutely true” recalls Heidegger’s critique of 
ontotheology: whatever it is that gives being to be cannot be indexed to human reason. We will 
always come up short as we stutter and stammer to speak what exceeds speech. Like Levinas for 
whom the Saying always exceeds the Said, we might say that within the metaphysician’s 
vocation the act of Responding always exceeds any Response. 
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 The fourfold denominates four voices or senses of being: univocal, equivocal, dialectical, 
and metaxological. If being can be said in many ways, this is not because we are accomplished 
polyglots who wantonly ventriloquize through being. On the contrary, and truer to the vocation 
of metaphysics as a response, we are tutored into a metaphysical articulacy by the fourfold 
thereby enabling us to speak of the plurivocal happening of being. This is essential if we wish to 
articulate a coherent metaphysics given that “our understanding of what it means to be comes to 
definition in a complex interplay between indetermination and determination, transcendence and 
immanence, otherness and sameness, different and identity.123 To be true to being in the between, 
to dwelling in the metaxu, we need a way to speak faithfully of determinacy (univocity) and 
indeterminacy (equivocity), of immanence and transcendence, and of the interplay between 
otherness and sameness (dialectic and metaxology). The fourfold provides a set of imbricating 
lenses revealing, with every addition, a richer and more finessed way to think about and respond 
to being. Rather than seeking to dissolve metaphysical perplexities, the fourfold (re)attunes us to 
the plurivocity of being and bids us to remain open to the sources of “wonder” and 
“astonishment” that inaugurate and animate philosophical inquiry.  
 
 
2.3.1  Univocity and its Limits 
 
 We begin with the univocal sense of being which Desmond takes to be “motivated by a 
desire to reduce the manifoldness of given being to one essential meaning.”124 Univocity stresses 
“sameness, or unity, indeed sometimes immediate sameness, of mind and being.”125 No doubt, 
univocity speaks to common sense and we are reminded of Bishop Butler’s quip, “a thing is 
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itself and not any other.”126 Univocity’s rallying cry: to be is to be intelligible, and to be 
intelligible is to be determinate.127 
 Without question, univocity is indispensable. We daily talk of discrete things – this jar, 
that car. Certain fields of inquiry, such as math, science, and engineering require  univocal 
precision: recall the 1999 Mars Climate Orbiter disaster because English units were not 
converted to the metric system or 1968’s Mariner I’s failure due to a misplaced hyphen.128 
Without gainsaying the need for determinacy and precision, though, Desmond observes that 
“recurrently throughout modernity, certain scientific orientations to nature have tended toward 
the reductive.”129 The univocal sense is “indispensable in identifying and distinguishing” beings 
in the quotidian, but there is more to being than what can be measured or managed. Being is 
more ambiguous and complicated than strictly univocal, or scientistically reductive, approaches 
would have us believe.  
 That said, it takes but a cursory look at philosophy’s history to reveal no shortage of 
thinkers who take univocity as the ideal canon of human knowledge. In its ontological and 
logical forms, one thinks of Parmenides, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and 
Deleuze. For univocity in the form of a “calculative mathesis”130 one turns to Descartes, the early 
Wittgenstein, and Badiou. Additionally, the siren’s song of univocity continues to be heard in 
our own day. When Thomas Nagel published Mind and Cosmos as a challenge to “reductive 
materialism,” the outcry was astonishing. Steven Pinker described the book as “The shoddy 
reasoning of a once-great thinker” and Daniel Dennett described Nagel as part of a “retrograde 
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gang” whose work is “cute and it’s clever and it’s not worth a damn.”131 Nagel’s heresy? He 
claimed 
the great advances in the physical and biological sciences were made possible by 
excluding the mind from the physical world. This has permitted a quantitative 
understanding of that world, expressed in timeless, mathematically formulated physical 
laws. But at some point it will be necessary to make a new start on a more comprehensive 
understanding that includes the mind.132  
 
Without denying the power of math and sciences, Nagel recognized their inability to wholly and 
definitively explain all phenomena. A more comprehensive approach is needed to accommodate 
what more reductive accounts leave out. This critique of reductive materialism comes, no less, 
from a philosopher who not only lacks a sensus divinitas but also strongly opposes any 
invocation of a transcendent being.133   
 Neither Nagel nor Desmond reject univocity; determinacy is necessary for intelligibility. 
They deny, though, that univocal determinacy exhausts intelligibility. In fact Desmond argues, 
“the will to absolute univocity is self-subverting, and cannot evade its own opposite, equivocity. 
This very insistence on univocity itself proves to be equivocal, for no univocal meaning can be 
given to the univocal insistence.”134 Reductive materialism abstracts from the plurivocal flux and 
fails to account for the emergence of the mind. This leads him to observe that “simply as self-
transcending, mind is an anomaly to the universal mechanism; it is excess, a surplus, ultimately 
indeed a surd. In a word, scientific univocity reduces being to something that cannot account for 
scientific mind itself.”135 Univocity’s reach, like apodictic reasoning’s, exceeds its grasp.  
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 In Plato’s philosophy, Desmond finds an intimation of a way to preserve the determinacy 
of univocity without the pretense of rendering all being determinate. He recalls how, above the 
gates to Plato’s Academy, a sign is said to have read: Let none who has not studied geometry 
enter here! For Plato, the rigors of geometry were propaedeutic for philosophical study. And 
Desmond contrasts Plato with Aristotle, for whom thaumazein or wonder terminates in  
a determinate logos of a determinate somewhat, a tode ti. But this end is a death of 
wonder, not its refreshening at a level of mindfulness marked by deeper or higher 
metaphysical sophistication. Not surprisingly, Aristotle invokes geometry to illustrate the 
teleological thrust of the desire to know (Meta, 983a13ff). What is geometry but a figure 
for determinate knowing in which all the ambiguity of perplexity is overcome or 
dissolved in the solution136   
 
Geometry, for Plato, capacitates philosophical inquiry by training the would-be philosopher in 
the rigors of logic and critical thinking. Philosophy, beginning in wonder, requires “midwives” 
possessing, like Socrates, the know-how and finesse to help others “discover within themselves a 
multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God’s help, 
who deliver them of this offspring.”137 For Aristotle, geometry proves less the training ground 
than the telos or destination of philosophy. Philosophical inquiry, rather than preserving wonder, 
“must end in the contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these 
instances when men learn the cause.”138 Nor is the desire for geometric precision exclusive to 
Aristotle: one may think of Descartes, Spinoza’s ordo geometricus, Kant, and Husserl.139  
 The rage for order that leads to the privileging of geometric precision as the ideal 
standard for knowledge is not limited to philosophy or its history: there is no shortage of 
reductive approaches (behaviorism, scientism) requiring being to fit within a determinate system 
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of categories. Such efforts manifest the ongoing relevance of what Pascal considered the l’esprit 
de géometrie. The “geometric mind” fixates on “objective truths such as we pursue in the hard 
sciences and mathematics.”140 Desmond playfully describes the geometrically-minded 
systematizers as those “who (mis)behave like the ugly sisters of Cinderella: the glass slipper will 
fit the foot, must fit the foot, never mind the blood on the carpet!”141 The ambiguities of human 
reality cannot all be fitted into a single system; we require, rather, Pascal’s l’esprit de finesse. A 
spirit of finesse resists temptations to dominate being, preferring instead a subtler and more 
discerning approach. It recognizes and appreciates being’s inherent equivocity and, rather than 
seeking to squelch it, aims to be mindful of the ambiguity and flux. The finessed mind does not 
revile geometry or univocity but sees it as part of a larger whole.  
 
2.3.2  Equivocity and the Restlessness Search for Wholeness 
 
 Desmond’s equivocal sense of being refers “to a plurality that resists reduction to one 
univocal meaning and one alone.”142Whereas univocity accents unity, sameness, and clarity, 
equivocity stresses manyness, difference, and ambiguity. One is reminded how the word dog can 
refer both to a pet or to a star with “no community of meaning between the earthly and heavenly 
dog.”143 Taken equivocally, dog has two distinct meanings. There is a limit, though, to the 
fluidity of equivocal speech. Just as pure univocity  
is a limit, so it is difficult to find absolutely pure instances of equivocity, which would 
imply a difference without even the hint of a possible mediation. Absolutely unmediated 
difference seems to be absolutely unintelligible; for even to state the putative absolute 
difference is in some way already to transcend it.144 
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Any attempt at an absolute or thoroughgoing equivocity proves self-subverting because 
equivocity is limited by an unavoidable recourse to determinacy: discourse is constituted, as 
Ricoeur observes, “by a series of sentences whereby someone says something to someone about 
something.”145 For equivocal speech to be communicative, it must be about some determinate 
something. So, despite its recognition of fragmentation and flux, equivocal speech cannot evade 
speaking of integral beings, even if only to call their integrity into question or to point out its 
inherent instability.  
 Within our daily lives, we find ourselves situated between the theoretical limits of 
absolute univocity and absolute equivocity, inflexible determinacy and unremitting flux. How 
one stands between the extremes will be influenced by the reconfigured ethos or “social 
imaginary.” Aristotle, for instance, took a dim view of equivocity due to  
his commitment to the law of identity and the law of excluded middle. A being is itself 
and not another thing. It is logically impossible to suppose that the same thing is and is 
not, as some think Heraclitus said. To be is to be determinate, a tode ti. If this is the case, 
our quest for intelligibility will always be marked by a certain predilection for 
univocity.146  
 
Elsewhere, in Book III of Rhetoric, we find one of Aristotle’s more ironic statements: “It is a 
general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver.”147 
Aristotle’s target is not surprising: Heraclitus. Aristotle continues, observing 
to punctuate Heraclitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a particular 
word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he 
says, “Though this truth is always men understand it not”, where it is not clear to which 
of the two clauses the world “always” belongs.148  
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For a thinker such as Aristotle, for whom geometric precision serves as the ideal canon for 
human reasoning, any trace of Heraclitean flux must be brought to heel. And, as we have seen, 
he is not alone in desiring to exorcise ambiguity. René Descartes, in the Discourse on Method, 
articulates as his first rule that the investigator ought 
never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such; that is to say, 
carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more in my 
judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no 
occasion to call it into doubt.149 
 
Let there be no doubt: this l’esprit de géometrie was hardly exhausted with Descartes’s death in 
1650. In our own age, Terry Pinkard observes the gradual abatement of the acrimonious 
relationship between “continental” and “analytic” philosophers; to dismiss the continentals as “a 
bunch of wooly minded gasbags”150 no longer carries the punch it once did. Cool comfort, 
indeed, as the majority of Anglo-American philosophy departments are analytic in orientation; 
so-called “wooly” thought is perhaps tolerated, but toleration is hardly the same as celebration or 
appreciation. 
 Due to its recovery of equivocity from the stranglehold of modernity’s fixation on 
univocal determination, Desmond expresses measured approval of certain strains of postmodern 
thought. Indeed, I think he would welcom welcome Caputo’s description of deconstruction as 
organized around the idea that things contain a kind of uncontainable truth, that they 
contain what they cannot contain. Nobody has to come along and “deconstruct” things. 
Things are auto-deconstructed by the tendencies of their own inner truth. In a 
deconstruction, the “other” is the one who tells the truth on the “same”; the other is the 
truth of the same, the truth that has been repressed and suppressed, omitted and 
marginalized, or sometimes just plain murdered…151  
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With Caputo, Desmond recognizes in all things an inextirpable ambiguity resistant to constraint. 
Hence the contribution of deconstruction in unsettling univocal complacency. The “inner truth” 
of being refuses constraint and its struggle against repression calls out to us, demands that we 
open our ears and eyes, to look again for what has been concealed beneath the too-neat and too-
tidy accounts rendered by univocal reduction.   
Desmond’s appreciation of equivocity’s truth does not rely solely upon the work of 
contemporary philosophy. Centuries before the efforts of Derrida, Caputo, Foucault, and Butler, 
William Shakespeare penned Macbeth as the play about equivocity: “Radical equivocity attaches 
to time, to daring, to trust, to power, to the elementals, to the nefarious powers, to sleep, to life 
itself and to death. ‘Fair is foul and foul is fair.’”152 It is the story of double appearances: a loyal 
vassal and his hospitable wife exposed through an act of traitorous regicide.153 Consider the flux 
following Duncan’s death  
Old Man: ‘Tis unnatural/Even like the deed that’s done. On Tuesday last,/A falcon, 
tow’ring in her pride of place/Was by a mousing owl hawked at and killed.  
 
Ross: And Duncan’s horses, a thing most strange and certain,/Beauteous and swift, the 
minions of their race,/Turned wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung out,/Contending 
‘gainst obedience, as they would make/War with mankind.154 
 
Throughout Macbeth, Shakespeare deconstructs the stable categories of good and evil, light and 
darkness, pure and impure. Hands are washed free of blood yet remain bloody; courage screwed 
to the sticking place is cowardice. Perhaps there is no better instance of the suppressed “truth of 
the other” than the ghost of murdered Banquo who bursts death’s constraint to give silent 
testimony to his concealed, nay murdered, truth.  
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  Mindful attention to equivocity requires an ongoing hermeneutic of text and action. 
Actions, like words, can bear of multiple meanings. Recall Casablanca 
You must remember this 
A kiss is just a kiss/A sigh is just a sigh 
The fundamental things apply/As time goes by 
 
A lovely sentiment, but true? Univocal reasoning wishes it so: everything is what it is, and no 
other. Equivocal reasoning notes a difference: the kiss of “Let him kiss me with the kisses of his 
mouth!” (Song 1:2) is not the same as “Judas, is it with a kiss that you are betraying the Son of 
Man?” (Lk 14:48). A kiss can be a kiss, a physical gesture, but it cannot be reduced only to a 
gesture; there is more to it than univocity can convey.  
 It is here we see metaxology’s ability to negotiate the space between univocity and 
equivocity by preserving the truth of each and refusing to slide into univocal dogmatism or 
equivocal skepticism. Metaxological metaphysics neither insists on a single univocal regula nor 
does it valorize equivocal flux in its indeterminacy. In short, what recommends Desmond’s 
approach is its ability to mediate between those “who are obsessed with inflexible determinacy 
and those who turn away from any kind of determinacy with disgust.”155  
 We can see how our earlier consideration of Taylor’s argumentative style illuminates 
Desmond’s strategy. By discerning and preserving the truth of both univocity and equivocity, 
Desmond’s metaxological approach capacitates both voices by holding them in a creative 
tension. He positions himself between univocity and equivocity to show how each speaks 
truthfully, albeit incompletely, of being. Instead of committing to one or the other voice, he 
searches for a way to capacitate speech in a way that can speak in multiple tongues, plurivocally. 
If all is not one (univocity) and all is not flux (equivocity) then we need a more nuanced, subtler, 
                                               
155 Desmond, Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness, 33.  
   44 
 
language able to speak of the metaxu the truth of both. Taylor gets at this interplay by 
recollecting Pascal’s image of the reed: “the human being in the universe has all the fragility of a 
mere reed, but its greatness lies in the fact that it is a thinking reed.”156 The human is so fragile, 
Pascal writes, “a vapour, a drop of water is enough to kill him” yet, in all the universe, “man 
would still be nobler than his slayer, because he knows that he is dying…The universe knows 
none of this.”157 The sublime can simultaneously “fill us with awe” while “reminding us how 
little we are.”158 We are equivocal beings: we are yet need not – and at some point will no longer 
– be at all. We incarnate, in our very being, the interplay of these voices.  
 As a result, Desmond’s philosophy “works” to the extent it implicates the reader within 
the metaxu and initiates a process of attunement to the voices at play within being. Rather than a 
hegemonic system imposed from above, Desmond’s metaphysics is better likened to a process of 
learning a foreign language by immersion in the flux. We learn vocabulary words and grammar, 
but our appropriation of the language comes about inductively, tentatively, and we often fumble 
when we try to say the right word. But, as we grow in articulacy, we find ourselves capacitated 
to give an account of what it means to be in the between: we see the world differently and 
understand ourselves in a new light. Metaxology, in sum, provides a tutorial empowering us to 
speak more faithfully about being because it permits us to dwell more mindfully amidst beings.  
This becomes clearer if we consider how the dynamism of our desire bespeaks a restless 
longing for wholeness. Desmond, showing his Platonic slip, recalls for his readers the discussion 
of desire found in the Symposium159 where Socrates claims  
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anyone who has a desire desires what is not at hand and not present, what he does not 
have, and what he is not, and that of which he is in need; for such are the objects of desire 
and love. (200e) 
 
Desire is not self-enclosed and has not the resources to sate its lack. Desire is intentional, it is for 
something, which leads Desmond to observe how desire always already  
reaches beyond itself. For this reason, lack is not solely negative: it attests to the stirring 
of an impetuous power through which desire begins to be more than itself. Negatively 
understood, it is a witness to unfulfillment; positively understood, it may make desire 
aware of itself and so awaken it to what is more than itself.160  
 
Desire impels us to reach outside of ourselves in a quest for wholeness. We do not merely have 
desire, like a passing craving for chocolate; desire, rather, is constitutive of creaturehood. It is “a 
form of life which, while originating in lack, wars with lack, seeking thereby to keep despair at 
bay.”161 But the lack animating desire does not betray desire as indigent or impoverished. Though 
the end is absent – otherwise we would not desire – it is not wholly absent; our anticipation of the 
end “is a relation which, in being dissatisfied with the gulf between a desire and its goal, refuses 
sheer absence.”162  
For Desmond, desire’s telos is present in its origin, disquieting it by reminding it of its 
lack and as-yet unachieved wholeness. Yet it is nothing less than the presence of the telos that 
impels us to begin the adventure of negotiating our identity in a process he calls “selving.”163 
Disquieted desire propels us on a passionate itinerary which, recalling Plato, is driven by Eros as 
“the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be complete.”164 In acknowledging this 
drive, Desmond stands with Augustine and Aquinas:  
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You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and 
our heart is restless until it rests in you.165 
 
Because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by 
creation…Second, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal 
good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is 
the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some 
particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination.166 
 
We are made and ordained to be agents of desire, unsettled and driven by an abiding longing that 
impels us outward in search of fulfilment. No matter what we count as possessions, we are 
always first possessed by a desire admitting no finite satisfaction: ours is a ceaseless, restless, 
and passionate quest for wholeness.  
 For Desmond, desire is a response elicited by the advent of being. We are, so to speak, 
struck into desire by being awoken to the ceaseless interplay of the univocity and equivocity of 
being. We come to ourselves a world of constant flux, one in which beings are born and die, 
come into being and pass away. Spread out before and behind us, we are aroused by and 
summoned to behold what Desmond calls the “infinite succession” of beings, 167 a notion tied to 
the categories of  
of univocity and equivocity in this sense. Our immediate inclination is to perceive the 
external world as a dispersed multiplicity of univocal particulars. In time, inevitably, this 
fixed definiteness is loosened up by our recognition of becoming and its open-endedness. 
Things in their determinate particularity, carried beyond themselves by the generating 
power of becoming, pass away and ultimately disappear into the indefinite succession of 
other particulars.168  
 
We need both univocity and equivocity to speak truly of the infinite succession of beings we 
encounter in the world of external becoming because 
external becoming might be seen as the dynamic process of coming to be and passing 
away that concretizes particular entities, yet is not spent by the plurality of already 
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realized particulars. It is open to the possibility of bringing into being and endlessly 
continuing the line of such entities.169   
 
Metaxology holds in creative tension the univocal stability of particular entities with the 
equivocal dynamism of becoming. It preserves the truth of each voice and permits them to 
express “two sides of the same orientation to the immediate.”170  
 To capacitate our ability to speak faithfully of the metaxu’s dynamism, metaxology 
makes use of univocal and equivocal categories. Neither one, on its own, is capable of 
accounting for the happening of the between. Univocity downplays the flux in favor of 
determinacy; equivocity revels in indeterminacy but betrays determinate particularity. Both 
capture an element of the truth, but neither expresses the fullness of the truth. By resisting the 
pressure to offer an either-or to the universal impermanence of being, metaxology makes 
possible a more finessed understanding of the infinite succession of beings.  
 
2.3.3  The Dialectical Sense of Being 
 The dialectical sense of being draws attention to “a process of interplay between same 
and different, between self and other.”171 Dialectic, Desmond continues, is  
etymologically in the same family as “dialogue”: mindful communication between self 
and other. Dialectic can refer us to a rhythmic process of unfolding, whether of process or 
events, thoughtful articulations or communications. There are many forms of dialectic. 
Socratic-Platonic dialectic, for instance, is bound up with dialogical openness to others. 
Modern dialectic, of which Hegel is perhaps the master exponent, is shaped by the ideal 
of autonomous thinking in which the self-determination of a process tends to be given 
primary place.172  
 
In this section, we consider how the practice of dialectic mediates between the self and other in 
search of a more inclusive unity. Rather than denying ambiguity, dialectic thinks through 
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equivocity en route to a whole capable of reconciling differences.173 The question: is the “whole” 
attained through dialectic truthful to being?  
 At its simplest, the practice of dialectic “seeks to recover what the univocal sense 
offers”174 without turning away from the complexities and ambiguities of the equivocal. It claims 
to uncover a unity beyond flux, a deeper and more abiding totality comprising a coherent whole. 
In thinking through the flux and gathering it into a whole, dialectic offers a nuanced version of 
univocity’s mantra: to be is to be intelligible, and to be wholly intelligible is to part of an 
encompassing whole.  
 Hegel, for Desmond, serves as the exemplar of modern dialectic. We risk, though, 
misreading Hegel if we naively assume he operates according to a formal method. As Desmond 
observes, “Hegel offers no static formalization of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (now recognized by 
scholars to be attributed to Fichte, more properly speaking).”175 Taylor, reinforces this insight in 
noting how dialectic is neither a method nor approach: 
If we want to characterize Hegel’s method in his great demonstrations we might just as 
well speak of it as “descriptive”, following Kenley Dove. For his aim is simply to follow 
the movement in his object of study. The task of the philosopher is “to submerge his 
freedom in [the content], and let it be moved by its own nature” (PhG, 48). If the 
argument follows a dialectical movement, then this must be in the things themselves, not 
just in the way we reason about them.176  
 
To borrow a phrase from Taylor, Desmond wants to read Hegel as offering a hermeneutical 
dialectics “which convince us by the overall plausibility of the interpretations they give.”177 
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Hegel’s system has to many seemed “the consummation of reason”178 but Desmond insists this is 
illusory. Hegel, he argues, “hides nuances, nuances that, if resurrected for rethinking, shed a 
different light on metaphysical thinking, and the possibilities of its contemporary renewal.”179 By 
means of an inquiry into the truth and limits of dialectic, Desmond seeks to expose the nearly-
imperceptible “cracks” in Hegel’s system, indicating thereby a way of escaping “the system” and 
opening up an itinerary capable of leading us toward the renewal of metaphysical thought.  
 The goal of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Desmond suggests, is to give an “insight 
into what knowing is.”180 This requires, consequently, an investigation into the role of mediation. 
Mediation, for Hegel, “is nothing but self-identity working itself out through an active self-
directed process.”181 The following gives a sense of this process 
The movement of a being that immediately is, consists partly in becoming an other than 
itself, and thus becoming its own immanent content; partly in taking back into itself this 
unfolding [of its content] or this existence of it, i.e. in making itself into a moment, and 
simplifying itself into something determinate. In the former movement, negativity is the 
differentiating and positing of existence; in this return into self, it is the becoming of the 
determinate simplicity. It is in this way that the content shows that its determinateness is 
not received from something else, nor externally attached to it, but that it determines 
itself, and ranges itself as a moment having its own place in the whole.182 
Hegelian mediation is self-mediation: “through self-mediation he endeavors to complete 
(captured pictorially in the image of the circle) the incomplete self-knowledge of immediacy.”183 
In a line sending shivers down Caputo’s spine, the consummation of self-mediation leads to 
totality: Das Wahre ist das Ganze, the true is the whole.184   
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 We should register no small degree of awe at the scope of Hegel’s self-mediating Idea. 
For here we find an approach with much to recommend itself to those who wish to preserve the 
truth of univocity and equivocity. Hegelian dialectic, first, describes a dynamic and gradually 
unfolding process which remains true to the flux of change over time. His own example of the 
bud à blossom à fruit illustrates a finessed understanding of the organic unfolding of this 
process.185 Second, dialectic does not shirk away from having to take account of the other; 
indeed, what Hegel calls the process of self-sublation (aufheben) describes how the Subject 
becomes determinate by sublating its other in a process that simultaneously cancels and 
preserves the other. Through sublation, the distinction between “self” and “other” is abolished by 
preserving the “other” within the self. Thus, Hegel’s dialectic holds out the promise of guiding 
us safely between the Scylla of a dogmatic univocity and the Charybdis of a chaotic equivocity. 
And, if we take the unfolding of Hegelian dialectic as a description of history’s unfolding, we 
could chart through the ages a record of inexorable progress as Geist unfolds itself forward in 
time as it becomes increasingly determinate and moves toward its ultimate consummation.   
 Yet, as Desmond is keen to alert us, we should be skeptical of Hegel’s grand system. For 
while dialectic does take account of equivocity, it does so in a way failing to respect the 
irreducible alterity of the other. As Simpson writes, “the dialectical sense taken on its own tends 
to absolutize itself and its self-mediation such that thought thinking itself becomes a univocal 
totality that is deaf to any mediation but its own – a solipsistic circle that closes in on itself.”186 In 
other words, while dialectic does account for plurality, it is a plurality subsumed into a larger 
whole. This, Desmond continues, is clearest in Hegel’s theology where God “others” Himself  
in finite creation, not to allow finite creation to be as irreducibly other to Himself, but 
because without God’s own self-othering, God Himself as beginning is all but nothing. 
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The creation is God’s self-othering and hence not other, but the ontological mediating 
detour in God’s dialectical self-mediation with Himself.187   
 
Desmond, consequently, refuses to take part in the “coronation of absolute spirit” or 
consummation of Hegel’s “system” when “Hegel places the crown on its head, and the hymn he 
sings is Aristotle’s Te Deum to noesis tes noeseos. This is Hegel’s highest amen to being.”188 It is 
an “Amen” directed not toward the God who transcends the whole but, rather, to the God who 
has become the whole. Little wonder, given this depiction of Hegel’s God, Heidegger refused to 
sing or dance before it.  
 Modern dialectic – in its Hegelian iteration – runs aground because it subsumes alterity 
into a more totalizing whole: “Hegel’s speculative unity is marked by, as we might call it, a kind 
of ‘dialectical univocity’.”189 Hegelian self-mediation results in a closed system unfolding from 
germ to full maturity according to its own logic. Looked at theologically, although it pays lip 
service to God, it cannot admit of revelation or irruptive grace, as these would require an 
intrusion into the system by a God who transcends it. Moreover, this would be a God alien to 
orthodox Christianity: the movement of Hegel’s dialectic unfolds from a state of lack and moves 
through stages toward ever-greater determinacy. God, in effect, has to become God over time. 
God is posse, possibility, but not that of Cusa or Kearney, neither of whom hold that God creates 
in order for God to be God.190 Prayerful appeal to the transcendent seems impossible because 
there is no transcendent Other; Hegel’s god occupies the same plane as humans. We are left, 
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Desmond’s writes, with God’s “counterfeit double”191 who masquerades as the Transcendent 
Other while remaining squarely within the immanent realm. 
 In attempting to think through the equivocity of becoming to recuperate a sense of 
univocity, Hegel’s dialectic overreaches and inscribes god within the system. As Heidegger 
noted, philosophy employs Hegel’s god: render the whole of reality transparent to human reason. 
This is not the god before whom we bow and pray but, rather, the one who subtends the 
centrality of the human being. Hegel writes: 
The love of truth, faith in the power of mind, is the first condition in philosophy. Man, 
because he is mind, should and must deem himself worthy of the highest: he cannot think 
too highly of the greatness and the power of his mind, and with this belief, nothing will 
be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself [sich eröffnete] to him. The essence of 
the universe at first hidden and concealed [verborgene und verschlossene], has no power 
which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay itself open before the 
seeker – to set before his eyes and give for his enjoyment, its riches and its depths.192  
 
In mediating between self and otherness, Hegel’s dialectic places humans center stage. Hegel’s 
Geist, Taylor observes, “lives as spirit only through men. They are the vehicles, and the 
indispensable vehicles, of his spiritual existence, as consciousness, rationality, will.”193 He 
continues, noting how for Hegel “I as a human being,”  
have the vocation of realizing a nature which is given: and even if I am called on to be 
original, to realize myself in the way uniquely suited to myself, nevertheless the scope for 
originality is itself given as an integral part of human nature, as are those unique features 
of me on which my originality builds. Freedom for man thus means the free realization of 
a vocation which is largely given.194  
 
Desmond regards this as “dialectically instrumentalizing” the individual who becomes “an 
instrument of the absolute whole: man, so to say, is the means by which God comes to self-
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determination; man is the medium of God’s knowing.”195 Hegel’s god needs us, indeed uses us, 
to become god; transparent knowledge of reality is not a gift given to humanity but the 
achievement of Geist through humanity.  
 Hegel’s practice of dialectic is found wanting because, in its commitment to preserving a 
sense of being’s univocity, it quells equivocity. So, although it remains cognizant of alterity, it 
does so in a way that fails to preserve the otherness of the other. Hegel, in other words, over-
emphasizes the “self” in self-determination, thereby reducing the Other to an instance of the 
Same. In Hegel’s system, there is a place for everything and everything in its place. One hears 
the howls from Caputo and Levinas! 
 This becomes clearer by situating the practice of dialectic within the metaxu. Recall the 
question posed at the end of the last section: how do we mediate with an infinite succession of 
beings? Infinite succession, we saw, describes the external world of becoming. Confronted by an 
infinite stream of beings who come to be and pass away, how do we “make sense” of the 
external world of becoming. Impelled by a desire for wholeness, how do we remain true to 
being’s determinacy and ambiguity? Neither univocity nor equivocity appear sufficient: a 
univocity without equivocity is static lifelessness, and equivocity without univocal determinacy 
would overwhelm us with chaotic flux. We yearn for wholeness, but neither seems capable of 
sating our appetites. How are we to respond from within the metaxu, the “Desmondian open 
space” where we feel wooed by both voices and their promise for wholeness?  
 What keeps us intact and permits us to withstand the univocal and equivocal forces 
buffeting us is called intentional infinitude, or “the power of open dialectical self-mediation 
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displayed in the articulation of human desire.”196 Intentional infinitude refers to our restless 
desire for the infinite. Our desire to mediate between unity and multiplicity  
seeks unity, rather than dispersal. We want to mediate between ourselves and the world; 
but more, we want to communicate ourselves to ourselves. Desmond describes this 
potency as circular, though not in a closed way, and founded in the appreciation that 
humans seek to know themselves. In this search they strive for open wholeness, as the 
desired end to their infinite restlessness.197   
 
A single clause distinguishes between intentional infinitude and Hegel’s dialectic: circular, 
though not in a closed way. Indeed, if we trace its roots to more ancient practices, intentional 
infinitude attests to the salutary potential of dialectic. In Socratic-Platonic dialogues, 
interlocutors journeyed together and engaged one another in open-ended in cooperative argument 
that seldom terminated in cut-and-dry answers. Perhaps this is the point: instead of giving “the 
answer” they offer “the invitation” to discern for oneself what it is that we love and, through 
discernment, grow in articulacy about their loves. As an exercise, dialectic seeks to preserve 
practitioners from complacency by reminding them that no single answer, no thing at all, can still 
the restless human heart.  
 Compared with Socratic-Platonic dialectic, Hegel’s totalizing system represents 
dialectic’s modern mutation. For whereas dialectic was an ongoing and unending practice for 
Socrates, Hegel employs dialectic in a way privileging self-mediation and  
takes its sights from the ability of thought to think what is other, and to bring the other 
into relativity to itself. The conclusion then drawn is that the thought that thinks the other 
overreaches the other; hence in thinking the other as a thought, it ends up as the thought 
that thinks itself, but now inclusive of otherness.198  
 
By closing the circle and terminating the dialectic in favor of the self, Hegel’s dialectic betrays 
the dia by abrogating the open-endedness of intermediation. Dialectic’s rhythmic give-and-take, 
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call and response, is arrested and freezes the community of being into a totalized whole. Its 
sentiment: “I go toward the other out of my own lack, I tend to the other not primarily to attend 
to the other, but as perhaps requiting my own lack. I am tempted to possess the other to enable 
my own achieved self-possession.”199 There is something vampiric or predatory about the self, or 
Spirit, who brings itself about not by reverencing the other but by using the other instrumentally 
to effect one’s emergence.  
 In the end, while it succeeds in recuperating a sense of univocity from the flux of 
equivocity, modern dialectic fails to account fully for the inherent ambiguity and universal 
impermanence of being. Dialectic recognizes alterity, but only in order to instrumentalize the 
other as a means to achieving its own end. Dialectic betrays eros by settling for what is not 
infinite. The problem: dialectic enacts a closure upon itself, creating a system in which 
individuals are sublated into the larger whole. Otherness is preserved, but at the cost of being 
counted now amidst the Same. The charge of ontotheology sticks: this is not the God of the 
Whole but God as the Whole.  
 
2.3.4  The Metaxological Sense of Being 
 The metaxological sense of being is Desmond’s neologism, a combination of the Greek 
metaxu or “middle” with logos meaning “word, discourse, account.” Metaxology, Desmond 
writes, “sees philosophy as seeking a logos of the metaxu, an intelligible account of what it 
means to be between or intermediate.”200 It stresses 
the mediated community of mind and being, but not in terms of the self-mediation of the 
same. It calls attention to a pluralized mediation, beyond closed self-mediation from the 
side of the same, and hospitable to the mediation of the other, or transcendent, out of its 
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own otherness. It puts the emphasis on an intermediation, not a self-mediation, however 
dialectically qualified.201  
 
In its emphasis on “pluralized mediation,” metaxology “tries to redeem the promise of equivocity 
beyond univocity and dialectic.”202 Whereas Hegel’s dialectic suppressed equivocity, metaxology 
recuperates equivocity and balances it with univocity.   
 Jere O’Neill Surber indicates how metaxology moves beyond Hegel’s dialectic: 
1. While univocity and equivocity remain…complexly interrelated, the true 
complexity and nuance of their interrelations cannot be adequately described in 
terms of some dialectical synthesis or “higher univocity.” 
2. Although a systematic framework for exploring this complex web of 
interrelations is indispensable, it cannot constitute the sort of “closed system” 
that the dialectical stance implies. 
3. While a metaxological perspective is not opposed to concepts…its concepts must 
continually maintain their connection with concrete experience, which lends to 
them a sort of openness and “jaggedness” or “irregularity of contour” suppressed 
in the dialectical approach.203 
 
In other words, metaxological philosophy (1) strives to preserve the truthfulness of both 
univocity and equivocity, (2) resists closure upon itself as “the system,” preferring to retain its 
openness to the happening of being, and (3) it swears off any pretense to “taking the measure” of 
being; indeed, its fidelity to the flux of being means that there is a surplus to being that remains 
inexhaustible by philosophical concept.   
 Metaxology cannot be thought of as attempting to transcend the metaxu or to offer a way 
of escaping the flux. On the contrary, it is a form of reflection attuned to beginning media res. 
“In a literal sense,” for Desmond, metaxology is necessary because “being between is an inter-
esse, where the interest is in the being of the inter. All genuine interest is inter-esse, not at all just 
what we normally call self-interest. The latter bends the inter-esse back to the self from the inter. 
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True interest is beyond self-interest, for it is truly beyond self and is in the inter.”204 Metaxology 
as a way of life, endeavoring to remain faithful to and speak truthfully of what it means to be in 
the between.  
 Now, while not antagonistic to all practices of dialectic, metaxology may be seen as 
needed in order to avoid Hegel’s “dialectical reduction.” 205 Whereas Hegelian dialectic 
privileges a singular self-mediation encompassing the Other within the Same, metaxology 
remains committed to a form of double-mediation. For Desmond, to be true to the nature of the 
metaxu means remaining mindful not only of self-mediation but also of the inter-mediation 
originating in what is other to the self. “Genuine philosophical thinking,” he avers, “must be both 
self-mediating and also open to the intermediation between thought and what is other to thought, 
precisely as other.”206 In this way, metaxological philosophy makes good on the promise of the 
dia in dialectic by resisting efforts to subsume the other into its categories, preferring instead to 
initiate a dialogue with the other. Such a give-and-take, essential to metaxology, renders it a 
dialogical, rather than a monological, practice. Instead of a soliloquy delivered by a self who 
“struts and frets his hour upon the stage,” metaxology initiates a dialogue. To be metaxological 
means that one “dwells with the interplay of sameness and difference, identity and otherness, not 
by mediating a more inclusive whole but by recurrence to the rich ambiguities of the middle, and 
with due respect for forms of otherness that are dubiously included in the immanence of a 
dialectical whole.”207 In its commitment to abiding within the flux and ambiguity of existence 
and giving ear the call of voices suppressed in other philosophical practices, metaxology affects 
a stance of ongoing vigilance, open and attentive to the call of the other. Metaxology, so framed, 
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becomes akin to a form of philosophical prayer listening for and willing to respond to the call of 
the Other.  
Whereas Hegel, as Aristotle before him, sought to achieve a determinate system, 
Desmond resists closure of the whole. Rather than proceeding by imposing categories upon 
being, metaxology proceeds more tentatively and in a style hewing closely to Socratic-Platonic 
dialogue. “I think of Socratic dialogue as witnessing to an honesty to where we find ourselves,” 
he writes, “an honesty also willing to confess that in the midst of the ordinary something beyond 
comes to make a call on us. We can receive the call(er), or we can turn away from the 
invitation.”208 Westphal and Kearney would nod in agreement, for here Desmond manifests an 
openness to Kearney’s micro-eschatology, the irruption of the transcendent into the immanent 
order, and to Westphal’s understanding of the nature of metaphysics as a vocation, a response to 
having first been called.  
Instead of seeing metaxology as a “penthouse” on top of the univocal, equivocal, and 
dialectic sense of being, Desmond envisions it as a way of bringing “to truer articulating what is 
at work in them.”209 The Hegelian slip shows as each sense of being is aufgehoben and 
incorporated into the metaxological. Metaxology neither supplants nor annuls these voices but 
hold together to allow each to speak of being. Metaxology symphonically weaves together each 
voice and allows it to speak its truth yet balances these voices so no one dominates the other. As 
a task, then, metaxology leads to a “practice of a kind of thinking”210 mindful of the plurality of 
voices at play within being.   
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Like dialectic, metaxology is a mode of mindfulness that “tries to think beyond an 
oscillation back and forth between univocity and equivocity, while facing both of these fair and 
square.”211 And, like Socratic-Platonic philosophy, metaxology unfolds as an ongoing dialogue – 
a process of being questioned and questioning – with being. Yet this surfaces a paradox: every 
time we question, we acknowledge a lack (otherwise we would not ask) and a presentiment of 
what is missing (we are, after all, asking about something). So, he asks, “How can mind be 
beyond lack, be somehow already full?”212 His answer: 
Plato (as we see from the Meno, and elsewhere) was attentive to the issue and puts the 
essential question: if we are in search, how do we recognize what we seek, did we not 
already have some sense of what we seek? If we did not have this prior sense of what we 
seek, we could not seek it at all in the first place. Contrariwise, if we do have this prior 
sense, why do we seek at all, since we already seem to have what we seek, and we cannot 
really seek what we already have?213   
 
For Desmond, the paradoxical lack points “deeper than lack to a more positive condition of 
being.”214 Like Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas, Desmond posits the presence of the end (telos) as 
abiding at the origin of our search (arche). Desire moves not from indigent lack to fullness but 
from the presentiment of plenitude toward actual plenitude.  
 This will become clearer if we return to the Symposium and the myth of Eros. Recall how 
Socrates, speaking in the voice of Diotima, recounts the birth of Eros to the group gathered at 
Callias’ bacchanal. Eros, Socrates-Diotima recounts, was conceived on the night of Aphrodite’s 
birthday. Poros, or “resource,” became drunk on nectar and fell asleep in the garden. Penia, or 
“poverty,” who had been begging outside the gates of the party seized this opportunity to 
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“relieve her lack of resources: she would get a child from Poros.” The offspring of Poros and 
Penia, Eros bears a likeness to both  
he is always poor, and he’s far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think 
he is); instead, he is trough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the 
dirt without a bed, sleeping at people’s doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky, having 
his mother’s nature, always living in Need. But on his father’s side he is a schemer after 
the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, 
always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a love of wisdom 
through all his life, a genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings. (203d)  
  
Eros is a being of the between: between mortality and immortality, poverty and riches, wisdom 
and ignorance. Indeed, Eros serves as one of the daimons, traversing the space between gods and 
mortals “conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring commands 
from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices” (203a). Eros appears as the “paradoxical mixture 
of poverty and plenitude,”215 the child in whom abundance and lack intermingle.  
It seems the dual parentage of Eros as the offspring of Poros and Penia is commonly 
forgotten. Hegel, for one, so stressed the indigence of Geist that no heed was paid to Poros; 
Hegel’s god moves from lack to fullness, from indeterminacy to determinacy, through a process 
of self-determination that overcomes what is lacking. A metaxological consideration of desire 
remains attentive, however, to Eros’s two inheritances: the surplus wealth of Poros and the 
poverty of Penia. Heir of both, Eros is born into a state of enriched poverty, bearing within itself 
a promissory note guaranteed by Poros’s surplus riches. Though it does not yet possess the 
fullness of its patrimony, the promise of fulfillment goads Eros’s restless adventuring. Contrary 
to the image portrayed in movies and novels, a properly Erotic itinerary is not one of promiscuity 
but of pilgrimage guided by desire’s restlessness toward the promise of infinite fulfillment.  
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 Our restless desire for fulfillment, animated by the enriched poverty of Eros, implicates 
us in the metaxu and as a metaxu. The between describes not only where we find ourselves on 
the map of being (topology) but also who we are as beings (anthropology). We began to see this, 
at least inchoately, when we discussed “intentional finitude” as the way we respond to infinite 
succession. Faced with the coming-to-be and passing-away of beings, we experience a drive to 
“mediate between unity and multiplicity in our search for wholeness.”216 We experience 
ourselves as being between lack and fullness and we intermediate between ourselves and things 
in search of wholeness. Our enriched poverty resists premature closure: no, this will not 
satisfy…continue your search. But the promise of dialectic, at least in its more modern forms that 
emphasize the self in this mediation, is betrayed when the circular movement between self and 
what is other terminates in the self. The vicissitudes of the flux are, in dialectic, brought under 
determinate control; the circle of inter-mediation is gradually closed in upon itself. The 
dynamism of being is ossified.  
  
2.4  Transcendence: Exterior, Interior, Superior 
 
 In this section, I consider the role of “transcendence” in metaxological philosophy. 
Transcendence, like being, can be said in many ways. Indeed, we have anticipated this discussion 
when we took up the nature of infinite succession, intentional infinitude, and actual infinitude. 
We need now to clarify how Desmond’s three types of “transcendence” arise from amidst the 
between and point beyond it. If metaphysical mindfulness arises in the midst of beings, then 
the question of transcendence has nothing to do with a leap out of being into the void, but 
with the deepest mindfulness of what is emergent in the middle itself. Again, the double 
meaning of meta is relevant. “Meta” is being in the midst; “meta” is also reference to 
what is beyond, what is transcendent. Metaxological metaphysics must think the 
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doubleness of this tension between being in the midst and being referred by self-
transcendence to the transcendence of what is other, what is over and above.217  
 
Tutored into a form of metaxological mindfulness, we will be able to recognize how the signs we 
encounter in the midst of the metaxu point beyond themselves to a superior transcendence on 
account of whom being is at all.  
 
2.4.1  Exterior Transcendence (T1) 
 Desmond claims: “the happening of the between is a metaxological community of 
transcendences.”218 Note, first, the between or metaxu is not static; it is a happening, an ongoing 
event. Metaxology reflects upon this happening in a plurivocal manner:  
Univocity puts the stress on something or someone determinate, this or that character or 
thing. Equivocity puts the stress on something more indeterminate, something neither this 
nor that, something ambiguous, especially in the heart of acting human beings. Dialectic 
puts the stress on a togetherness of oneself and others, on a meditation of our differences 
in the exchange with each other. Metaxology does not dispose of these three senses but 
aligns them more truly with what in the between is more than determinable and beyond 
our self-determination. It is attentive to many-meaninged inter-play, bringing more to the 
fore the plurivocity of inter-mediations between oneself and others.219  
 
As a happening, second, the between possesses a communal character. The “happening” does not 
take place solely within each being; it happens between and amidst them. Thus, when Desmond 
refers to the “community of transcendences,” he is indicating how at the basic and most 
primordial level of being, each and every being is in relationship with what is other to it. To be at 
all is to be in relationship because being is relational. 
 The first transcendence in this community is what Desmond calls “exterior 
transcendence” (T1). We saw this above when we treated infinite succession, referring to “the 
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transcendence of beings as other in exteriority.”220 It is easy to take for granted that beings are 
other to us and exist independently of us, each with its own integrity. Exterior transcendence, 
Simpson observes, keeps us mindful how “the otherness of the world precedes and exceeds our 
thinking of it.”221 There are determinate beings other to us and irreducible to any system; being, 
in its intransigent resistance to schematization, bears witness to something in excess of 
determinacy. Being as other to us is not indeterminate or awaiting our impress to give it form; 
being as other to us is and remains overdeterminate and cannot be fixed or frozen in place. Esse 
Semper Maior: being is always greater and its overdeterminacy cannot be systematized or 
exhausted.  
 A metaxological mindfulness of T1 remains alert to how we are always immersed within 
a world of beings. Beings come into being and pass away; flowers bloom and wither, animals are 
born and die. “There is a constitutive doubleness that, as coming to be and passing away, is 
inscribed ontologically on their being as becoming.”222 This doubleness affects the way we 
perceive and reflect upon what it means to be. In the tree outside my window, a robin builds her 
next. On an ontic level, I know what she is: a bird. I behold her and am aware of her ontological 
doubleness: last spring, she was not but now in late summer, she is; in a year, in all likelihood, 
she will be no longer. She has being now, but only fleetingly.223 Along with every other finite 
being, she bears within herself the crack of equivocity rendering her susceptible to the ebb and 
flow of time.   
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 Metaxological mindfulness does not, however, despair at the inherent fragility of being. 
This is because the wash of infinite succession can both 
appall us and exalt us. We face our own nothingness, and yet we feel ourselves strangely 
native to the cosmos. We shrink to nothing before the immensity, and yet we sing our 
thanks out into the openness. And there are breakthroughs beyond the sense of void 
infinity, such as made Pascal afraid, into an appreciation of infinitude as plenitude. We 
breathe the glory of the sublime creation, in its disproportion to our power to master it.224   
 
Where the ontic question probes what something is in its determinacy, and the ontological 
question considers how something perdures as an identity-in-impermanence, it falls to the 
metaphysical question to ask after the whole of being: why being at all? 
 For one metaxologically attuned, the question Why being and not nothing? erupts as a 
response to having heard the address of being. We come to be in the midst of being’s happening 
and grow mindful of how beings are interconnected and intermediate with one another. 
Metaphysics begins, consequently, as a response to dwelling amidst and stirred into mindfulness 
by being. The external world communicates itself, poetically expressed by Gerard Manley 
Hopkins in As kingfishers catch fire: 
 Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
  Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; 
  Selves—goes its self; myself it speaks and spells, 
  Crying What I do is me: for that I came.225   
 
Metaxology responds to the address of exterior transcendence and empowers our response. 
Philosophical approaches guided by Descartes, for instance, would look askance at this 
approach, perhaps even deeming it eccentric. And, in a way, metaxology is eccentric: it is neither 
centered in nor does it index being to the Cogito because it is elicited as a response in a dialogue 
initiated from outside oneself.  
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The vector directing every act of self-transcendence finds its origin, accordingly, not in 
the self but in the advent of transcendence. Again, recall Augustine’s response to creation as he 
seeks the object of his love. Over and again, no being satisfies his quest, each pointing beyond 
itself and the created order toward its Creator.226 Far from a dispassionate looking about, his 
odyssey is an eccentric quest enacted as a response to experiencing the call of exterior 
transcendence manifested in beauty. Augustine, having been addressed by being, is implicated in 
a quest to move beyond himself toward being (T1) and, finding no created thing capable of 
satisfying his restless desire, toward the one of whom all beings in exterior transcendence sing 
“He made us” (Ps 99:3).  
 
2.4.2  Interior Transcendence (T2) 
  Confronted by the oscillation of exterior beings as they come to be and pass out of being, 
we are struck with metaphysical wonder: why anything at all? Being does not unfold neutrally 
before us; rather, we are drawn into the interplay of being where we take a stand on ourselves. 
What Desmond called earlier intentional infinitude proves doubly implicating, by launching us 
into a quest for an ultimate origin and exposing within ourselves the abyssal depths of a restless 
desire to know. Thus, the “transcendence” in self-transcendence conveys both (1) the act of 
reaching out beyond oneself and (2) an awareness of transcendence abiding within the depths of 
one’s being. Interior transcendence (T2) indicates “the transcendence of self-being such as we 
meet especially in the self-surpassing power of the human being.”227 The capacity for self-
transcendence renders us creatures of possibility who, in freedom, take a stand on who we 
become: 
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the meaning of possibility can here be defined immanently rather than just determined 
externally. There is possibility as freedom, perhaps even as the promise of free finite 
creativity. Human self-transcendence awakens to itself in the astonishing givenness of 
being, awakens to its own astonishing powers of self-surpassing. Human beings are finite 
yet exceed finitude in their self-surpassing.228  
 
Self-transcendence, moreover, bears the dual mark of eccentricity and ecstasy. Self-
transcendence originates in its being awakened to itself in the midst of beings, an awakening 
instigated by the address of being. Self-transcendence is eccentric in being a response to having 
been astonished. As ecstatic, it is not just “outer reaching” but other reaching: it reaches out 
toward being other to itself, directed by being’s call to the self. The “vector of transcendence”229 
originates neither in the self nor is it self-authored; its origin is external and, consequently, each 
act of self-transcendence must be thought of as a response to an anterior summons. We are open 
to self-transcendence, to reaching out beyond ourselves, because we are first opened by 
transcendence.  
  Self-transcendence responds to and is guided by our awaking to what Desmond calls the 
“intimate strangeness of being.” Intimate strangeness 
refers to the middle condition of our thought of being: being is strange because it has an 
otherness, indeed marvel, of which we are not the conceptual masters; it is intimate, in 
that this very strangeness allows no stance of thinking “outside” being – we are 
participants in what we think about. Being indeed gives us to be before we think about 
the meaning of what it is to be. The strangeness of being is as much about us, as we are 
within it.230  
 
Stirred by being, one knows oneself as one among other beings, yet recognizes that their 
“strangeness” eludes any conceptual schema. We know beings intimately because we are among 
them and we are because of them, yet they elude capture by our concepts. Self-transcendence 
possesses, then, a double movement. The self is awakened by the advent of transcendence, the 
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address of being other to self; the self is awakened to transcendence, impelling it outward in a 
ceaseless quest for wholeness.  
 
2.4.3  Superior Transcendence (T3) 
 We turn now to what Desmond calls actual infinitude, superior transcendence, or 
transcendence itself (T3). This is not to be confused with “the highest being in the sense with 
which God is often identified – namely, the ens realissimum.”231 The God of whom he writes is 
not “a” being because transcendence itself (T3) is  
in excess of determinate beings, as their original ground; it would be in excess of our 
self-transcendence, as its most ultimate possibilizing source. It would be beyond the 
ordinary doublet of possibility/reality, as their possibilizing source; it could not be just a 
possibility, nor indeed a realization of possibility. It would have to be “real” possibilizing 
power, more original and other than finite possibility and realization. It would have to be 
possibilizing beyond determinate possibility, and “real” beyond all determinate 
realization.232  
 
What is most distinctive about “transcendence itself” can be encapsulated in one word: 
possibilizing.233 Transcendence itself is the possibilizing source of the other two transcendences 
as their origin and sustaining ground.  
 Desmond’s “possibilizing” God bears no relation to the god rejected as ontotheological. 
Ontotheology’s god takes up residence and has a job to do within the immanent order. Such a 
god becomes, as Westphal writes, “a Highest Being who is the key to the meaning of the whole 
of being.”234 With Heidegger, Desmond views Hegel’s god as the palmary example of 
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ontotheology. For Hegel, “God ‘needs’ man, and hence is defined as what it is or may be in 
terms of its relativity to us.”235 Rather than a possibilizing divinity, Hegel’s god is one for whom 
divinity remains but a possibility:  
a God that is not truly what it may be in the beginning, but has to become itself, fully 
realize what it might be, or may be, in a process of becoming or self-becoming, in which 
it is teleologically, or eschatologically, more fully itself or complete at the end of the 
process. I think this way of thinking runs a grave risk of producing counterfeit doubles of 
God, even it gives to some the satisfaction of being needed by God.236  
 
Hegel’s god is an “erotic absolute” defined by an “indefinite abstraction or lack; self-exit into 
otherness; return to self through and from the otherness; now in the end explicit self-constitution, 
finally determined as fully real.”237 This god unfolds and is driven by the indigent lack of Penia 
with scant recognition of the enriched poverty inherited by Poros.  
 By describing it as possibilizing, Desmond means to extricate “transcendence itself” from 
the plane of being. God is not a being but, rather, the origin, creator, and sustainer of being. This 
is not a God of inner potentiality or a need to create. God’s relationship to the whole is 
asymmetrical and non-reciprocal: God possibilizes being, gives being to be at all, but not to 
achieve any self-serving goal. God does not need humanity to work out God’s issues or to 
become God. The creator and sustainer of all creates not out of poverty but from rabundance; 
God possibilizes the whole of creation for no “reason” other than the goodness of being itself.  
 Any recourse to a God not confined to our immanent order cannot but stress our 
language. Indeed, Desmond recurs to several metaphors in an effort to express a sense of the 
transcendent God who evades capture in finite speech. Instead of the “erotic absolute” who needs 
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creation, he employs metaphors of the agapeic absolute,238 absolute original239 and agapeic 
origin240 to draw attention to the “too muchness” and excess of God’s creative power. Metaphoric 
speech is inescapable when speaking of God. For instance  
The absolute original as depth is a metaphor for the ground of being. Interestingly, the 
Latin for “high,” altus can also mean “deep”…As a vertical transcendence, the absolute 
original is beyond a univocal either/or; it is double, both high and deep. It requires a 
metaxological both/and. As height, it is transcendent to the world; as depth, it is its 
immanent ground…This ground, or, better, this grounding, is the profound upsurge of the 
power of being, that most intimate constituent of beings without which they would be 
nothing…To say that the absolute original is the ground is to say that all finite being is 
shot through with its own dynamic orientation toward absoluteness, toward its own 
potential wholeness and participation in infinite for which all creation grown.241  
 
Note how the metaphor works to portray “transcendence itself” as intimately present to the 
whole of creation. It spans the heights and depths of created being; indeed, by grounding creation 
it leaves upon the created order a trace of its creative excess, an enriched poverty, orienting us 
toward fulfillment. The metaphor opens consideration what it means to be in the midst of being 
(meta) while gesturing beyond itself to what is beyond being (meta) as the creative and 
possibilzing source of all that is.  
  Let me conclude this section with Kearney’s meditation on The Song of Solomon 3:1-4. 
This brings into relief not only a sense of Desmond’s transcendences but shows how they 
implicate one another. Kearney quotes the following passage from the Shulamite bride  
Upon my bed at night I sought him whom my soul loves;  
I sought him, but found him not; I called him, but he gave no answer. 
“I will rise now and go about the city, in the streets and in the squares; 
I will seek him whom my soul loves.” I sought him, but found him not. 
The sentinels found me, as they went about in the city. 
“Have you seen him whom my soul loves?” 
Scarcely had I passed them, when I found him whom my soul loves.  
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For Kearney, as Desmond, “the anxious, expectant seeking of the love-struck bride is reversed 
into a being-found, that is, a being desired.”242 A nocturnal yearning stirs the bride and impels her 
from the bedchamber. This is not a feckless search, a random casting about, but a deliberate 
quest for her Beloved. She knows the one for whom she seeks, the one who awakened within her 
the stirring of a desire that takes her out into the city streets (T2). She canvasses the city in search 
of traces of her beloved (T1). But, as Kearney points out, “it is only after the bride has passed the 
sentinels who found her that she finds Him whom her soul loves.”243 It is because God first calls 
to us, calls us into being, calls us into relationship, that we can call out and search for God. The 
deepest longing of the human heart is an enriched poverty endowed by its Creator who is at once 
the origin and end, arche and telos, of desire and its fulfillment.  
 The range of transcendences considered (T1 – T3) comprise what Desmond calls the 
metaxological community of being. And, as it should be clear from his inclusion of self-
transcendence, we are, each of us, included within the community of transcendence wherein each 
and every being intermediates with what is other to itself. The world around us is not a neutral 
tableau; it, too, has been called forth and is sustained by Transcendence itself. The beauty of 
creation addresses us as we are struck, or pierced, by a face, a vista, a song. Metaxological 
reflection does not bring us into the community of transcendence; it as a response to awakening 
within it, in media res, as we are launched upon our own iteration of the Augustinian itinerary ab 
exterioribus ad interior, ab inferioribus ad superiora: from the exterior to the interior, from the 
inferior to the superior.  
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2.5  Minding the Between: The Furrowing Brow of Immanence 
 In this final part, I round out our consideration of systematic metaphysics by thinking 
through the modes of “minding” the between. For Desmond, mindfulness of being unfolds in 
three stages: astonishment, perplexity, and curiosity. Of these he writes 
there is something excessive and overdetermined about the astonishing beginning; then 
there is a troubled indeterminacy and sense of lack, in the perplexity of mind that is 
subsequently precipitated; finally, there is a drive to definitive and determination in 
curiosity that seeks to overcome any survival of troubled indefiniteness and lack, such as 
we find in perplexity.244  
 
He distinguishes these modes because, in the modern era, we have stressed the determinate drive 
of curiosity and recessed the other two. In tracing the evolution of our mindfulness of the 
between, he actually gives us a metaphysical genealogy in many ways complementary to 
Taylor’s. Hence “the furrowing brow of immanence” describes the historical process moving 
from “wide-eyed astonishment” to “squinted-eye perplexity” to, finally, the “furrowed brow of 
curiosity” insistent on total determinacy.  
 On the ontological level, Desmond’s description of our preference for l’esprit de 
geometrie over l’esprit de finesse complements Taylor’s. But, as a metaphysical account, 
Desmond opens up a new vista for us to explore: for while the modes of mindfulness may forget 
their origin in astonishment, they can never un-inherit their ancestry. The curious mind may 
bristle at, or think itself allergic to, overdeterminacy, but astonishment abides in its DNA. By re-
activing even long-dormant seeds of astonishment within our mindfulness, metaxology holds the 
promise of renewing the way we live in the between.  
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2.5.1 Wide-Eyed Astonishment: Porosity of Being and Passio Essendi 
 “The beginning of mindfulness,” Desmond writes, “is in an original wonder before the 
givenness of being. Such wonder is often recognized but its significance is not always 
plumbed.”245 This insight has roots in Aristotle, Plato, and Thales of Miletus. Thales, Plato writes 
in the Theatetus was so enraptured by the stars he fell into a well.246 Aligned with these figures, 
Desmond considers “the advent of metaphysical thinking is in a primal astonishment.” Indeed, 
this astonishment is primal, elemental, and irreducible:   
Plato speaks of thaumazein as the pathos of the philosopher. This is sometimes translated 
as wonder and this is not inappropriate. Astonishment, however, captures the sense of 
being rocked back on one’s heels as it were, by the otherness of being in its givenness. 
Plato says pathos: there is a pathology in metaphysics. There is a suffering, an 
undergoing; there is a patience of being; there is a receiving that is not the production of 
the metaphysician or mind.247  
 
Note the imagery: we are rocked back, we suffer and we undergo the address of what is other to 
ourselves. In astonishment, we experience the “bite of otherness”248 inflicting a wound opening 
us to what is other than ourselves. We are open because opened by the givenness of being, a 
givenness defying delimitation by concept or exhaustive expression by speech. The 
overdeterminacy of being breaks upon us as a “rupture and renewal, at once a refreshed 
distancing and a drawing close of mind and being.”249 Unlike Frodo, who bore a sliver of the 
Morgul-knife within his shoulder, this wound does not inhibit or threaten to incapacitate our 
adventure; to the contrary, the rupture of astonishment capacitates us by rending us open to what 
is other to ourselves and prompts us to pose the question of what gave us to be. Wounded by 
astonishment, we ask: Why anything at all? 
                                               
245 Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being, 5.  
246 Theatetus 174a 
247 Desmond, Being and the Between, 8.  
248 Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being, 106. 
249 Desmond, Being and the Between, 8.  
   73 
 
 Calling to mind our “Five Commandments,”250 let us consider the following description 
of astonishment as the source of metaphysics. Astonishment, Desmond holds,  
opens a mindfulness that we do not self-produce. Astonishment is a precipitation of 
mindfulness before something admirable, or loveable, or marvelous, communicated from 
an otherness that has the priority in speaking to the porosity of our being. It comes to us, 
comes over us, and we open up in response. We do not first go toward something, but 
find ourselves going out of ourselves because something has made its way, often in 
startling communication, in the very depths or roots of our being, beyond our self-
determination.251  
 
If metaxological mindfulness originates in this sense of astonishment, the punches thrown by 
critics against metaphysics will not land. Metaphysics, first and foremost, responds to the 
advance of something other and outer to ourselves. It does not privilege any singular locus for 
“the Truth” because it originates in the everyday encounters, amidst the flux, where we are 
struck by what is “admirable, or loveable, or marvelous” communicating itself and pointing to 
something in excess of itself. Metaphysics answers the call heard as we stand amidst beings 
(meta), a call directing us beyond beings (meta) to the source of being itself. Opened by 
astonishment, we are creatures of ecstatic desire reaching outward and otherward from the 
abyssal depths of our enriched poverty as our desires strains forward toward the promise of 
ultimate fulfillment.   
 There is something inescapably childlike about astonishment. A girl grasps her father’s 
hand and says in hushed awe, “Look, the moon!” A boy devours fairy tales and play-acts them. 
Children live comfortably in the “primal and elemental” stage of astonishment, unafraid to show 
their wonder or to ask the “big questions.”252 Indeed, childhood astonishment may augur the 
future: she may become a physicist, he an actor. Yet, though we grow out of childhood, we do 
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not have to lose our capacity for childlike awe. Desmond observes, “the child is not only the 
father to the man, but the man is the shield of time that shelters, or denies, the idiotic child he 
was born as.”253 How many of us began careers only to lose zest and joy because, rather than 
nurturing a sense of childlike wonder or awe, we banished our inner child to the cellar?  
 My point: Desmond’s description of astonishment not only informs by describing it but, 
in returning us to its origin in the metaxu, it also invites us to recollect experiences of being 
“rocked back” or “struck.” This invitation requires a level of finesse, a certain patience, and a 
willingness to consider “the nuances of singular occasions.”254 But by ruminating on the 
“nuances of the singular,” metaxology can bring to light otherwise concealed or recessed depths. 
In fact, I believe we can get at two more concepts central to Desmond’s metaphysics –the 
“porosity of being” and the passio essendi – by looking at the following example drawn from the 
work of Hans Urs von Balthasar.   
Balthasar describes how, “the little child awakens to self-consciousness in his being-
called by the love of his mother.”255Translated into metaxological terms: the advent of the mother 
is irruptive and invitatory; her loving smile and tender caress addresses the child, simultaneously 
enabling and inviting the child’s response. Balthasar continues: 
Since, however, the child in this process replies and responds to a directive that cannot in 
any way have come from within its own self – it would never occur to the child that it 
itself had produced the mother’s smile – the entire paradise of reality that unfolds around 
the “I” stands there as an incomprehensible miracle: it is not thanks to the gracious favor 
of the “I” that space and the world exist, but thanks to the gracious favor of the “Thou.” 
And if the “I” is permitted to walk upon the ground of reality and to cross the distance to 
reach the other, this is due to an original favor bestowed on him, something for which, a 
priori, the “I” will never find the sufficient reason in himself.256  
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Desmond would agree: mother and child have their own integrities and inter-mediate. The 
awakening of self-consciousness, or the beginning of mindfulness in astonishment, have a 
similar dynamic: the call of transcendence engenders self-transcendence. Still more: the call of 
the other, the in-breaking of the other’s address, capacitates the “I” by astonishing the “I” into 
movement. movement.  
So, what does metaxology add?  
 For starters, metaxology surfaces the means by which intermediation is possible: the 
porosity of being. The porosity of being, for Desmond, describes the “between space where there 
is no fixation of the difference of minding and things, where our mindfulness wakes to itself by 
being woken up by the communication of being in its emphatic otherness.”257 One must resist 
reifying this idea by thinking of discrete beings as having “pores” or “openings” permitting 
transit and mediation. Porosity is not something to be had because it is no thing at all. However, 
if the porosity of being  
is not determinate objectivity neither is it indeterminate or self-determining subjectivity. 
There is fluidity and passing – a liquid matrix. The porosity is prior to univocal 
objectivity and it is prior to intentionality. In and through it we are given to be in a 
patience of being more primal than any cognitive or pragmatic endeavor to be.258  
 
Porosity is more akin to the enabling milieu or the dynamic and ongoing happening of 
intermediation. There is something intrinsically paradoxical about it: 
Strange wording: filled with openness. For such a porosity looks like nothing determinate 
and hence seems almost nothing, even entirely empty. We cannot avoid what looks like 
the paradoxical conjunction of fullness and emptiness: being filled with openness and yet 
being empty. This is what makes possible all our determinate relations to determinate 
beings and process, whether these relations be knowing ones or unknowing.259 
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To be human means being confronted with this paradox. Astonishment fills us with emptiness: 
we behold being filled wide-eyed wonder, but wonder is no thing. We undergo at once the 
fullness and lack and later, in reflecting upon what is lacking, we intimate fullness. 
Etymologically heir to Poros, porosity conveys the enriched poverty, intermingling lack-and-
fullness, at the heart of desire.  
As a ceaseless happening, Desmond suggests meditating on porosity as a kind of “passing 
in passage.” An elusive concept, he connects this “passing in passage” with the act of creation 
which “arising in being and setting, coming to be and passing out of being, creation brings to be 
the porosity within whose intermedium all things live and move and have their being.260 Porosity 
is creation’s endowing endowment: it is given to be in the creative act and it gives creation to be 
a dynamic happening. So, far from an inert “block” or static creation, porosity endows creation 
with the character of an intermedium or vibrant field of intermediation. The metaxu, seen in this 
light, shimmers with movement. The community of transcendence (T1-T3) does not simply take 
place on the metaxu as though on a proscenium. The metaxu pulses with happening of the 
between, the potent fluidity “passing in passage” as it doubly intermediates the “passing in 
passage” amidst created beings (meta) as its overdeterminate excess points beyond creation 
toward its creator (meta). The “porosity of being” means there is, indeed a crack in 
everything…and everyone. We are, Desmond writes, “the porosity of being become mindful.”261  
 Herein we find an otherwise recessed feature of anthropology brought to light by 
metaxological reflection. Porosity is not a transitory feature or a function of history. One way of 
reading A Secular Age might be as a narrative of how once we were porous but now we are 
buffered. Desmond wants to resist such readings, point out how porosity is 
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ontologically constitutive, not just historically relative, though it may be true that some 
epochs exhibit a feel for it, while others reconfigure the ethos of being, and human being, 
and the porosity is driven underground, say, or out of mind, say, or warped into forms not 
true to the promise of the original givenness.262  
 
The porosity of being is anterior to any effort to reconfigure the ethos. Indeed, every era is but a 
reconfiguration of primal ethos. This means, accordingly, 
We do not have to identify the primal ethos of being either with a more porous world or 
with a more buffered world, though a more porous world is closer to the threshold of a 
more original receiving of being, less cluttered by the construction we have made 
according to the desires of our own endeavor to be. That there is a reconfigured world 
means that the modern world we have so configured has a relative character: it may 
reveal some potencies of the given ethos but it also may hide or repress or cover over 
other potencies.263  
 
Every era, every “social imaginary” or reconfigured ethos, is relative to the primal ethos: each 
era shapes and forms it, but no reconfiguration exhausts it. Any given reconfiguration of the 
ethos may be more, or less, faithful to the “promise of the original givenness” but no 
reconfiguration will ever encapsulate or drain its endowment.  
 A recuperation of these repressed potencies has significant theological consequences. 
Responding to Taylor’s account of the buffered self, Desmond observes 
perhaps it is the case today that many people have difficulty praying because we have a 
diminished feel for this more original porosity of being. Of course, if it is true as 
Professor Taylor says that we have become buffered ourselves, this should not be at all 
surprising. In the process of buffering ourselves we have not more truly realized our 
promise, in fact, to the contrary, we have reconfigured ourselves in forgetfulness, if not in 
mutilation, of the communication of original porosity.264  
   
For Desmond, the distinction is not that we were porous and are now buffered. This latter 
description would be untrue and betray our constitutive porosity: we may be clogged or 
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reconfigured against porosity, but porosity cannot be annihilated or overcome. It needs to be 
purged and awakened through a renewed sense of astonishment.  
 To Balthasar’s account metaxology contributes an expanded and enriched horizon in 
which the address of being can be issued and answered. To be sure, there is something 
instinctively right about Balthasar’s observation: ideally it is the mother (or father) whose love 
awakens the child to itself. But as Kearney urges, we need always be on the lookout for micro-
eschatologies, the epiphanies of the everyday. By recollecting experiences of astonishment, by 
meditating on the overdeterminate happening of being, we can become alert to how the “nuances 
of the singular” communicate something in excess of singularity. We can be stirred by the 
intimation of transcendence within us, passing in passage through us, weaving us into whole of 
the metaxu. 
 Also at play within Desmond’s treatment of the porosity of being is what he calls the 
passio essendi. The passio conveys the sense that before we grasp at being (conatus essendi) we 
have first to be given to be. It reminds us that “given being is mine, but that it is not given to me 
by myself.”265 For Desmond, the passio  
tells against every autism of being. In it is already an intimate mark of being in 
community. That communicability surges up in our passion of being means that it is 
already given as an active promise of being in relation to our very being at all. The 
doubleness of relativity (self-relation is never without other-relation) is expressed in the 
fact that we are conatus essendi as well as passio essendi. We are the endeavor to be as 
well as the patience of being.266  
 
The interplay of the conatus and passio essendi are likewise central to Desmond’s thought, so let 
me give a sense of how a wide-eyed astonishment might take note of them.   
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 For Desmond, the passio essendi refers to a patience or undergoing going of being and is 
the older twin of the conatus essendi. Emerging in the porosity of being, the passio  
refers to a certain ontological patience signaled by the fact that we are first recipients of 
being, of being received in being, before we flower as being active. There is an 
ontological receiving before there is an existential acting. As something ontological, this 
receiving is constitutive of our being but it is not self-constituted. To call it passio is not 
to imply a mere dead thereness devoid of its own energetic life. Its own life is not first 
owned by it; it is given to be its own on the basis of a giving that is not its own.267 
 
Yet the receiving of the passio is no feeble receptivity. Better to think of it as an endowment 
seeding the self with freedom: one is given to be in order to become. Before one intermediates 
between beings (T2) or beholds being as other to oneself (T1), one must first be given to be. Only 
after “coming to be” can one assert oneself in freedom.   
 Students of philosophy, however, are surely more familiar with the passio’s younger 
twin, the conatus essendi, who figures prominently in Spinoza’s thought. The conatus 
communicates a sense of grasping at being and self-assertion. Its exemplars include 
Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hegel’s self-determining Geist, Kant’s 
autonomous subject, and Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Over the course of the modern era, “the 
intimacy of being, articulated as passio essendi and conatus essendi, mutates into the twins of 
subordination and dominion, submission and overcoming. The first is the passio made abject, the 
second the conatus made superject.”268 The recession of the passio and the gradual clogging of 
porosity leaves the conatus to seize the center stage.  
By no means does Desmond want to deny the conatus. His intention, though, is to finesse 
our understanding of it and to re-balance it with its. Indeed, part of this finessing involves 
surfacing an ambiguity modern promoters of the conatus seek to conceal. Whereas thinkers such 
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as Spinoza and Nietzsche interpret the conatus as self-assertive, Desmond calls attention to an 
etymological fact that co-natus, properly speaking, is not  
an endeavor to be but a being “born with.” Conatus refers us to a more original birth 
(natus) a being given to be which is always with or from another (co, cum). The 
pluralization is there but occluded in the ordinary way of thinking of self-interests and the 
conatus. The endeavor to be is often the more noted aspect of our being because it 
defines us as a doing of ourselves. Especially in the West, we forget the fertile doubleness 
about the endeavor to be…More truly, the conatus refers us back to the patience of being, 
and indeed to a coming to be, a birthing.269  
 
We are both a conjoined “patience of being” and an “endeavor to be”; we incarnate both the 
passio and conatus. We assert ourselves because we have been given to be and this given being 
endows us with the porosity that permits self-transcendence. A reappraisal of the co-natus 
enjoins an even deeper mindfulness that beings are not monads: relationship is not 
epiphenomenal but constitutive of our having been called into existence.  
 Sourced deep in the philosophical tradition, metaxology is rooted in experience of 
originary wonder or astonishment. Struck by the advent of transcendence, we are “rocked back 
on our heels.” Astonishment is a wide-eyed response: our eyes expand in order to take in the 
happening, but there is too much to apprehend all at once. Considered metaxologically, however, 
astonishment reveals more than just the bite of otherness catching us off guard. Mindful 
consideration draws attention to elements of the metaxu otherwise taken for granted: the porosity 
of being and the passio essendi. Porosity: the metaxu shimmers with the “passing in passage” of 
beings intermediating with one another, yet as each era passes by and the primal ethos undergoes 
constant reconfiguration, “…nature is never spent; there lives the dearest freshness deep down 
things.” Passio essendi: being cannot be taken for granted but as granted and gratuitous. It is, yet 
need not be. The rupture of astonishment that there is anything at all includes a moment of self-
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reflection I am, yet need not be. Try as we might, the gratuity of being exceeds our grasp, 
remaining always overdeterminate.  
 Desmond often refers to astonishment as “agapeic” because “it arises from a surplus or 
excess out of which an affirmative movement of mind as self-transcending emerges.”270 And, 
elicited by agape, one’s self-transcending response is not simply for 
purposes of a return to the self. I do not go out from myself toward the other to 
appropriate the other and through the other to return to myself. I go toward the other 
because the other is for itself and always irreducible to what it is for me.271   
 
There is a prodigal festiveness to agapeic astonishment; it possesses an unconstrained 
exuberance in need of being shared, poured out, and given away freely. The agapeic mind, 
“names a mode of thought thinking what is other to thought, in which there is a release of 
thinking from itself toward the other as other.”272 As we shall see as we consider the gradual 
furrowing of immanence’s brow, the way we mind the between has lost touch with its origin in 
agapeic astonishment. Other forms of mindfulness may wander far from their home of origin, but 
they cannot extirpate their lineage.  
 
2.5.2 Perplexity’s Squint 
 As we have seen, a metaxological understanding of astonishment points to two openings. 
There is, first, an “inarticulate coming towards us of the intimacy of being.”273 We undergo the 
opening rupture of being’s advent, the passio essendi opening us and awakens us to the porosity 
of being. Second, having been opened, self-transcendence records our efforts to exercise our 
freedom in search of greater determinacy. The awakening of the passio empowers the 
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adventuring of the conatus as it asserts itself in freedom. The rupture of otherness, witnessed in 
astonishment, inaugurates the process of selving wherein the power of the passio giving us “to 
be” concretized through the self-articulation of the conatus. The human being remains 
inescapably a human becoming as it negotiates its identity within the metaxu after having been 
given to be in the metaxu.  
 For Desmond, perplexity arises subsequent to astonishment and denominates a mode of 
mindfulness attuned to the outward striving and self-assertion. Perplexity arises subsequent to 
astonishment. As Simpson notes, “the intimate strangeness of being gives rise not only to 
astonishment but also to perplexity. In perplexity, the focus of mindfulness is drawn to the 
strangeness of being, while the intimacy of being becomes recessed, ambiguous, ambivalent.”274 
Whereas astonishment luxuriates in being enveloped by being’s overdeterminacy, perplexity 
finds itself ill at ease. Instead of overdeterminacy and surplus, perplexity detects indeterminacy 
and negative equivocity. Perplexity, astonishment’s prodigal son, sets out to “make sense” of 
indeterminacy and puts the stick to the conatus as its asserts its freedom and autonomy.   
In perplexity, the “eyes” narrow to size up what had bowled one over. Squinting eyes 
enframe and take the measure of what is other to the self. For Desmond,  
perplexity is not patience to the otherness of being in quite the same way as is the original 
astonishment. In its troubled mindfulness there works a vector of self-transcendence that 
would go toward this otherness of being and, if possible, overcome its own perplexity. 
Perplexity is felt as a lack of definite cognition, driving out beyond itself to overcome 
that lack.275  
 
The perplexed mind is troubled by overdeterminacy. The exuberant “It is!” of astonishment gives 
way to “What is?” and impels perplexity forward in an act of inquiry. What was undergone and 
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received in the event of astonishment elicits a counter-movement, one aimed at “making sense” 
or “getting to the bottom” of what took place.  
 Perplexity is “erotic” insofar as it arises out a sense of indigence. Erotic perplexity is 
driven by a desire forgetful of the endowed poverty inherited from Poros. Desiring to overcome 
its felt lack, erotic perplexity’s seeking 
is qualified by the aim of alleviating perplexity’s own troubled mindfulness. In this 
regard, it is tempted to turn the self-transcending into a search that finally is for the sake 
of returning the self to its own epistemic peace or satisfaction with itself. Then I go 
toward the other out of my own lack, I tend to the other not primarily to attend to the 
other, but as perhaps requiting my own lack. I am tempted to possess the other to enable 
my own achieved self-possession. 276  
 
Erotic perplexity regards what is other to self in terms of instrumentality. Whereas agapeic 
astonishment’s self-transcendence moves in affirmation of otherness, erotic perplexity’s self-
transcendence moves to utilize otherness to sate its own need.  
 Perplexity, though, need not sever its ties with astonishment. Consider the first chapter of 
Michael Buckley’s Denying and Disclosing God where he examines the increasingly fraught 
relationship between science and faith. Galileo accepted, as many today do not, a version of 
Augustine’s insight in De Genesi ad literam: “the language of scripture is adapted to the 
preconceptions and understanding of the culture in which it was written. Its grammar does not 
bear upon the issues of astronomical inquiry.”277 Only when we confuse the grammar of the 
“Book of Nature” and the “Book of Scriptures” do we find them contradictory. But because of 
God’s authorship, both Revelation and Nature proclaim the Creator. For Augustine, faith and 
science were hardly antagonistic. What arose in response to the advent of the holy one (faith) did 
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not forbid ordered inquiry into nature (science). A certain porosity allowed for an intermediation 
of the truth provided one distinguishes the grammar according to which each speaks.  
 By the end of the 17th century, however, the intermediation between faith and science 
became more difficult. The lives of Galileo (1564-1642), Kepler (1571-1630), and Newton 
(1642-1727) trace a series of scientific developments interpretable as a gradual “perplexed 
squinting” gradually delimiting scientific inquiry to an immanent field of study. Buckley 
describes the consequences of this shift as resulting in 
three distinct settlements negotiated between the new knowledge and the ancient faith: in 
Galileo, they are separate enterprises, neither contradicting the other and neither having a 
place within the other. Where certainty is found, the one will correct the other as is the 
case with any knowledge. In Kepler, they are finally a single enterprise, a deduction of 
what is likely and appropriate within the universe from the triune nature of God and the 
suggestion or the confirmation of that deduction from observation and mathematic. In 
Newton’s universal mechanics, science gives to religion crucially important evidence, its 
methodology, and its foundation in fundamental religion.278   
 
Each in his own way, these were thinkers variously hospitable to God. For Galileo, “religion and 
science differ in subject matter, purposes, appropriate methods, or procedures, and language. If 
these differences are maintained, each can contribute to the general advance of human beings 
toward real knowledge.”279 Kepler, by contrast, took the doctrine of the Trinity as an a priori and 
sought to unify astronomy and theology. This alignment means scripture and geometry are 
equally theological languages: “the study of geometry, then, and all of those things whose truth 
is geometrical, is finally the study of God.”280 Newton turns Kepler on his head. Instead of 
arguing from an a priori belief in the Triune God, Newton frames “a science that was universal 
in its compass and which argued to the divine reality from the nature of the world.281 For 
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Newton, then, the basis of creation was not the Creative God of whom all creation sings but, 
rather, a universal mechanics giving “a foundation to both mathematics and religious belief.”282 
 If we look at the movement from Augustine to Galileo, and from Galileo to Newton, I 
think we can get a sense of how perplexity has evolved. In Augustine, there is a sense of porosity 
between the human and creation. We saw this, earlier, in Book X of the Confessions and, more 
recently, in his insight found in De Genesi ad literam. In Augustine, we have a sense of the 
balance of the passio and conatus. By the time of Galileo, however, the balance has begun to tip. 
Instead of a fluid intermediation between religion and science, Galileo presages Stephen J. 
Gould’s NOMA (Non-Overlapping Magisteria) wherein faith and science have nothing to do 
with one another: live and let live, so to speak. A generation later, we find in Newton a thinker 
for whom the precision of the universe requires a God. His cosmos is a system, 
a unity composed of the sun, planets, and comets whose masses and motions are 
proportioned so carefully that they “could only proceed from the counsel and dominion 
of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Mechanics, if it is to be faithful to its reduction of 
movement back to force, must go beyond mechanical causes.283  
 
By Newton, we have a cosmos stripped of metaphysical excess or overdeterminacy. The God 
countenanced by a perplexity bereft of astonishment is a deus ex machina invoked as necessary 
to push the start button on the universal mechanism. There seems no place in this system for the 
theophanic God who offers the divine name in Exodus 3:14 or the God revealed at Jesus’ 
baptism. Rather than disclose its name, Newton’s god it “from the mechanics that has furnished 
the warrant for his existence and attributes.”284  
 Newton is not alone in being possessed by a rage for order. Descartes, Hegel, and the 
early Wittgenstein are all erotic perplexity’s epigone as each tries to bring a sense of determinacy 
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to the whole. The point: in eras dominated by erotic perplexity, the chiaroscuro of exterior 
transcendence (T1) will be regarded as a sign of troubling equivocity in need of determination. 
Hence the “squint” of perplexity: one squints in order to narrow the range of vision, to bring the 
object of inquiry into greater relief. Wide-eyed astonishment cedes to the perplexed gaze which, 
having registered, It is! tries to overcome its own sense of ignorance by establishing more 
concretely what it is.  
 As a mode of metaphysical mindfulness, perplexity is itself a metaxu, between 
astonishment and curiosity. There is no “one-speed” perplexity, because it admits of a range. It 
can be wooed by l’esprit de finesse and remain in close contact with its roots, preserving a 
balance between the conatus and the passio. It can be seduced by l’esprit de geometrie to wander 
far from its origin in astonishment as it strives to “get the measure” of what it beholds. Newton, 
to my mind, seems the incarnation of perplexity: harnessing the power of the conatus, he works 
out a mechanics of the cosmos at least prima facie hospitable to the divine. Heidegger’s critique 
of ontotheology’s god lands: this is hardly a god before whom one sings, or dances, or offers 
prayers. Could it be otherwise? Only thinly connected to its origin in astonishment, Newton’s 
“God was not encountered as a presence; God was inferred as a conclusion from what one did 
encounter.”285 
 
2.5.3  Curiosity’s Furrowed Brow 
 Desmond’s third form of mindfulness is curiosity. When perplexity strays too far from 
astonishment, it mutates and becomes increasingly hostile toward being. For the curious mind 
the overdeterminacy of astonishment 
can be too easily forgotten, just as also the troubled indeterminacy of perplexity can be 
dulled. If to be is to be determinate, here to be is nothing if it is not determinate. Being is 
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nothing but determinacy and to be exhausted in the totality of all determinations. The 
danger: hostility to ontological astonishment is twinned with the annihilation of the 
wonder of being itself.286  
  
Curiosity abhors vagueness and imprecision; for the curious mind “being is a mere strangeness to 
be domesticated; beings are mere strangers over against us to be fixed and conquered – strangers 
to be made, by us, no longer strange.”287  The play of equivocity cannot be countenanced and 
must be brought to heel: to be is to be determinate, and all will be determined. If astonishment 
was rocked back by overdeterminacy, and perplexity sought to get the measure of a seemingly 
indeterminate happing, the task curiosity sets itself is to give the measure as it tries to solve the 
“problem” of being.  
 Desmond regards curiosity as astonishment’s “ungrateful child.” It is modernity’s 
l’enfant terrible at whose impatient insistence the ethos has been reconfigured  
out of distrust of equivocity, expressed in the univocalizing mentality of dualistic 
opposition that produces a devaluing objectification of being on one side and a 
subjectification of value on the other side. Both sides deprive value of ontological 
ground, and this devaluation, in turn, forces the subject to step into the emptiness where it 
manifests itself in a reactive activism, itself expressing a will to power that will to ground 
itself, or that claims to be self-generating, or indeed that in final exasperation dismisses 
all grounding and proudly stands there as groundless will to power that will brook no 
resistance from any other, that will make no apology for itself, but simply will insist that 
its way will be the way and the truth, and that it will get its way.288  
 
Petulant curiosity turns its back on the festivity of astonishment (It is!) and the wanderlust of 
perplexity (What is?) to state soberly: What is it? as it trains its gaze at the “determinate being 
there of beings.”289 
 If Newton proved an exemplar of a hypertrophied perplexity, let me offer Denis Diderot 
(1713-1784) and Baron D’Holbach (1723-1789) as exemplars of how the narrow eyes of 
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perplexity become the furrowed brow of curiosity. At their hands, Newton’s universal mechanics 
undergoes a drastic modification. From Newton, Buckley writes,  
Diderot and d’Holbach accepted the universality of mechanics, that the mechanical 
method could deal with all of reality from mathematics to theology; what they rejected of 
Newton was his claim that the mechanical study of natural phenomena necessarily leads 
to a non-mechanical principle, to a transcendence source above nature, i.e., to God. From 
Descartes, Diderot and d’Holbach refused his metaphysics or first philosophy as 
nonsense – as Newton had before them; but from Descartes, they accepted the autonomy 
of mechanics, i.e., that all physical reality was mechanical and must be explained through 
mechanical principles.290  
 
For Diderot and d’Holbach, there is no need to invoke the divine in order to make sense of the 
universe or its operations. The universe is a self-contained whole, closed in upon itself. By 
enacting a synthesis between “universal mechanics (à  la Newton) with only mechanical 
principles (à la Descartes)” and revolutionizing “natural philosophy by making matter no longer 
inert, but dynamic,” Newton’s deus ex machina becomes a deus otiosus, “not so much denied as 
unattended to, detached and uninvolved, not influential in the world and of human beings, and 
finally yielding to oblivion.”291 
 One of the key factors contributing to the rise of modern atheism was actually the 
inaction of theologians who bracketed out appeals to religious experience. Enamored of the 
explanatory power of scientific inquiry, they appealed less and less to the specifically theological 
sources that gave life to faith: out goes appeals to prayer, liturgy, mystics, saints, and scripture. 
Buckley observes, “to bracket the specifically religious in order to defend the God of religion 
was to assert implicitly the cognitive emptiness of the very reality one was attempting to 
support.”292 Theologians hitched themselves to the system of universal mechanics, convinced this 
would provide the sure and steady foundation to ensure the stability of their system. Yet thinkers 
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such as Diderot and d’Hollbach aw what Wittgenstein expressed: “a wheel that can be turned 
though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.”293 Curiosity, its brow furrowed, 
brushes off appeals to God as “wooly” and unnecessary: if it cannot be measured, it cannot 
matter. Little wonder the metaphysical question Why anything at all? is written off as absurd.  
 In no way is this to be taken as a wholesale rejection of curiosity: in its insistent focus on 
determinate beings, curiosity is true to being. As we considered, we have a need for univocal 
precision. Curiosity betrays the truth of being, however, when it insists univocity is the truth, 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. While Desmond wants to preserve the healthy impulse of 
curiosity, he resists scientistic reductionism and its attempt to conflate curiosity with the extent 
of “being and knowing.” For 
scientism the outlook takes hold that the univocalizing approach is the one and only 
approach. This is a contradiction of the plurivocity promised in the other modalities of 
wonder. Determinate curiosity has its place within the embrace of the more original sense 
of wonder, and while it occludes it, it cannot itself even function, much less prosper, if it 
does not dip back again and again into the primal modality of the originating 
astonishment.294  
 
In light Taylor, there appears a homology between the “buffered self” and curiosity. Both have 
lost a taste for the transcendent, both affect a pose of disengaged inquiry and self-directed 
autonomy. They exhibit what Desmond calls an “allergy to transcendence” (T3) because their 
understanding of “self-transcendence has been yoked to a model of autonomous self-
determination: the self is the law of itself.”295 
 Both curiosity and Taylor’s “buffered self” need to be led back to the wellspring of 
astonishment. We may have reconfigured ourselves to be buffered, but “buffering” cannot be, 
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per Desmond’s anthropology, an irreversible fait accompli. Not only are we constitutively 
porous, we are porosity made mindful of itself. This porosity permits an intermediation between 
stages of mindfulness. The metaxu admits of other reconfigurations, and we may contribute to 
future reconfigurations by our efforts to re-awaken our age to a sense of astonishment. Human 
mindfulness is not fated or condemned to sojourn in the metaxu bereft of wonder. The furrowed 
brow of curiosity, too, may be struck by something in excess of determinacy – despite its best 
efforts – and find itself renewed. Considered ontologically, the map of our age accounts for how 
curiosity became the dominant mode of mindfulness. Read in a metaxological light, however, 
one can perceive itineraries conveying us along return routes leading us to a rekindling of 
astonishment. This is because, for Desmond, we move 
from ontological astonishment before being toward ontic regard concerning beings, their 
properties, patterns of developments, determinate formations, and so on. It is essential to 
the becoming of our mindfulness that we move into curiosity. The overdeterminate is 
saturated with determinations, not an indefiniteness empty of determinacy. The question 
“What is it?” turns toward the given intricacy of this, that, and the other thing, and there 
can be something even reverent in this turning, for it too shares in our porosity to the 
astonishing givenness.296  
 
Ungrateful curiosity may furrow its brow and lock itself away to obsess on “this, that, and the 
other thing” but even at its most anti-social, curiosity cannot rid itself of its origin in wonder and 
awe. Even in its tunnel-like fixation on determinacy, it may turn a deaf ear to the woo of 
astonishment, but it is not wholly deaf. It may not initially recognize itself in the web of the 
metaxu but it is not impossible that, given the right twitch upon the thread, for curiosity to be 
rocked back once more to marvel with wide-eye: It is! 
 Desmond’s approach to metaphysics capacitates us with an approach to reflection 
remarkable in its scope and its ability to offer a finessed account of what it means to live in the 
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metaxu. Rather than telling us about it, he tries to develop our ear for the plurivocity of being and 
our eyes to recognize the crack in all beings. He shows, too, how our mindfulness of being 
undergoes shifts depending on our proximity to astonishment that inaugurates metaxological 
mindfulness. The spectrum of mindfulness becomes the speculum in which we are given to 
recognize ourselves. The renewal of wonder we need, however, is not a once-and-for all 
occasion but an ongoing commitment: 
So long as life continues, one has to say yes to wonder. This is not a matter of reviving 
our capacity for wonder. In a way, we do not have a capacity for wonder; rather we are 
capacitated by wonder – and capacitated through it to wise mindfulness. Since this 
capacitation is not determined through ourselves alone, we alone cannot revive it. 
Wondering is not a power over which we exercise self-determination; it witnesses to a 
given porosity of being that endows us with the promise of mindfulness. If there is to be a 
revival of the capacity, it is in coming home again to this porosity – and its capacitating 
of our powers.297      
 
We may not be able to “exercise self-determination” when it comes to astonishment, but I 
believe we can embark upon a series of exercises that can sensitize us to the advent of 
astonishment. Indeed, we began this process some time ago when we began to learn the grammar 
and explore the nature of metaxological metaphysics. The paradox of metaxology: we are 
capacitated by knowing our incapacitation. This is a lesson learned over and again: metaphysics 
is capacitated by the advent of transcendence; our grasping at being (conatus) is capacitated by 
our being given to be (passio); our being-in-relation to being is capacitated within the 
community of transcendence in which we live and move and have our being; our incapacity to 
reduce being’s flux into capacitates us to perceive the irreducible porosity of being, the “crack in 
everything,” ourselves included. Our incapacity to sate our restless capacitates us to embark on 
the adventure of selving as we journey forward toward the promise of wholeness for which we 
most desperately long. Our incapacity to corral or control the Transcendent capacitates us to 
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develop a form of patient mindfulness, attuned to the goodness and gratuity of creation, as we 
await in hope for any signs or hints of the advent of the One who sings us into being.  
 
3.0 Conclusion 
 
 In Philosophy and Its Others, Desmond speaks “of the naming act of philosophical 
mindfulness as thought singing its other; for in singing we meet an outpouring of articulation of 
enigmatic affirmative power, even when the song airs the grief of suffering being.”298 In keeping 
with this theme of thought as singing, I want to conclude this thesis with three considerations.  
 First: a word about the relationship between Taylor and Desmond. At the end of the last 
chapter, I expressed my belief that Desmond preserves and advances Taylor’s project. In this 
chapter, I suggested a way of reading Desmond’s understanding of the metaxu as a metaphysical 
supplement to Taylor’s ontological “social imaginary.” A metaphysical supplement, attentive not 
only to how beings are but why they are, may help to allay Janz’s concern over Taylor’s reticence 
about offering a demonstrative proof for the Transcendent. Desmond, we shall see soon enough, 
offers a series of indirect “ways to God.” In this way, we can think of Desmond as Taylor’s 
consigliere who assures Janz, “Yes, yes, there is a there there. His map is trustworthy.”  
 As well as providing indirect ways to God, Desmond’s philosophy tutors us in a form of 
“subtler language.”299 This is necessary because our modern language  
1. Has lost, and needs to have restored to it, its constitutive power. 
2. The loss of this power means we deal instrumentally with the realities which 
surround us; their deeper meaning, the background in which they exist, the higher 
reality which finds expression in them, remain ignored. 
3. Our language has lost power to Name things in their embedding in this 
deeper/higher reality. 
4. This incapacity of language is a crucial facet of an incapacity of being, that our 
lives are reduced, flattened. 300 
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Metaxology, in its attentiveness to the plurivocity of being, attunes us to otherwise obscured 
depths. The language of metaxology works to inform and form the reader. Cyril O’Regan rightly 
identifies metaxology as moving beyond the level of flattened discourse when he describes how 
metaxology is doubly poetic 
first in the discursive sense that philosophy is a raid on the inarticulate that enlists in its 
articulation any and all available forms of discourse (e.g. symbol, myth, comedy, 
tragedy), and second in that the making (also unmaking) of selves and community has 
dramatic pattern with both comic and tragic elements.301  
 
Desmond’s texts, O’Regan observes elsewhere, “perform nothing less than a fundamental 
reopening of a philosophical discourse, which, from its first appearance in the Occidental 
tradition, intends the origin as the really real.”302 Desmond’s texts implicate the reader in a 
meditation aiming to reveal what remains often concealed. We need many words, multiple 
metaphors and symbols, in order to awaken us to being’s depths. Metaxology attempts to finesse 
the curious mind, the instrumental mind, by wooing it back to the sources of astonishment.  
 The curious mind or the buffered self, faced with the ineffable Mystery of God, throws its 
hand up in exasperation. God, actual infinitude, or transcendence itself is: the divine it cannot be 
captured in a system. Hopkins knew this: 
 We guess; we clothe Thee, unseen King, 
 With attributes we deem are meet; 
 Each in his own imagining 
 Sets up a shadow in thy seat.303   
 
Desmond offers us a metaphysically rich yet ever-humble form of speech cognizant of its own 
limitations. Metaxology is wounded speech, bearing within it the rupture of transcendence. But 
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we are capacitated by this wound, not only to speak a metaphysically subtle language but also, 
and more importantly, to watch vigilantly for any sign or disclosure of Transcendence’s advent. 
In enjoining us to a patient watchfulness, metaxology becomes for us a way of living 
prayerfulness.  
 Second task: let me recall Emerson, a thinker for whom the presence of “a crack in 
everything God has made”304 points to an intrinsic vulnerability or fatal flaw afflicting beings. 
His quote invokes two flawed heroes, but the truth of his observation is universally applicable. 
Hero or villain, saint or scoundrel, every being bears a crack.  
The crack, though, need not be an occasion for sorrow. We bear upon us, within us, an 
open wound resistant to closure. Interpreted metaxologically, the crack is an opened opening, a 
rupture of the self by transcendence which opens us to transcendence. We bear this wound as a 
mark of our eccentricity, as it comes from outside ourselves, and this wound renders us beings of 
ecstasy capable of reaching beyond ourselves to the one who awakened us. We are led out into 
the metaxu where the crack in all finite beings is a sign of fragility and gratuity. We turn inward, 
to our abyssal depths where, in awe-struck astonishment or the intentional solitude of prayer, we 
encounter an abiding otherness 
marking one’s intimacy to self. There is also the communication of the incognito God in 
the deepest ontological porosity of one’s soul, so deep that it seems like nothing, since 
too the porosity is itself no thing – the open between space in which communication of 
the power to be is given and different selvings take determinate form. One is never alone, 
even when one is alone.305  
 
On account of the crack in everything, ourselves included, we can awaken to the intimate 
universal: and interior presence weaving us into community with the whole of being.    
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 The crack in everything gives the metaxu it iridescent shimmer as beings mediate 
themselves and intermediate with one another. Indeed, it possibilizes metaxology, for it “dwells 
with the interplay of sameness and difference, identity and otherness, not by mediating a more 
inclusive whole but by recurrence to the rich ambiguities of the middle, and with due respect for 
forms of otherness that are dubiously included in the immanence of the dialectical whole.”306 The 
porosity of being is ontologically constitutive, the “condition of our being opened (intimately) 
and to our being open (potentially universal) to what is other and beyond us.”307 Rather than 
being incapacitated, we are capacitated to read the metaxu as a sign of immanent transcendence, 
the abiding presence and daily disclosures of the Transcendent who gives being to be and 
sustains creation in existence.  
 Third task: philosophy as singing its other. There is an expression regularly heard through 
the pubs of Desmond’s native Ireland: How’s the crack? In a pub, the “crack” is not a thing, but 
it is also not nothing. The crack is the milieu, the happening, the intermediation of beings, the 
“passing in passage” between the bar and the musicians playing in the corner and the laughter 
and stories shared at tables. A night of good crack: family from overseas are in town and the 
whole family turns out for a few pints. A fiddle player taps her bow and the seisiun lifts off with 
a set of fiery reels. An elderly couple, whose dancing days should be long behind them, forget 
themselves and dance a two-hand. A poem is recited, a song is sung, an aire is played: the 
gathering goes quiet. A joke told brings peals of laughter. A marriage proposal. A first kiss. New 
love. No one element makes the night, no one instrument accounts for all the music, but in the 
“passing in passage” they interweave and contribute to the happening of the night. Good crack.    
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Good crack must not be taken for granted but only ever as granted, an unexpected and 
welcome happening, never duplicable and always unique. It cannot be planned and must emerge 
of its own accord, unfolding organically and drawing participants into itself. It is not the 
achievement of the conatus as an endeavor, but the co-natus as a “being born with” each other in 
the moment. It is an undergoing, a suffering of something beyond the group, something that 
galvanizes the evening and leaves all in attendance wanting more. One becomes attuned to the 
crack and develops a knack for “sniffing it out.”  
Desmond offers us a metaphysics of the crack. As a happening, we only come to 
recognize “the crack” in the midst of it, awaking it its excess media res. By the time we are 
asked, “How’s the crack” it already englobes us. To respond, “ah, it’s good crack” says almost 
nothing, but how say more? Any respond will stammer because no word can say it all. To 
describe the crack risks betraying it. 
Desmond gives us the subtler language, a form of poetic attunement, needed to speak 
faithfully of the metaxu’s happening. Rather than imposing an interpretation or trying to capture 
the between, he leads us into it with a renewed mindfulness of its richness and ambiguities. 
Desmond gives us a way of wording the between, of standing within the metaxu in a way 
receptive to undergoing it. Though Wordsworth’s entire poem sings of this, let me quote the last 
two stanzas of “The Tables Turned” 
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; Enough of Science and of Art; 
Our meddling intellect   Close up those barren leaves; 
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:  Come forth, and bring with you a 
 We murder to dissect.    heart 
    That watches and receives.308   
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We, too, must arise and “quit” our books and venture, adventure, forth to immerse ourselves in 
the metaxu. We must stay the knife of murderous concepts and wait, patiently, in a stance of 
watchful receptivity. Like the happening of an Irish seisiun, must not close our ears to what 
unfolds before us. We must enter, experience, and undergo what it means to be in the between.   
 I am convinced that William Desmond, in his metaxological philosophy, gives us a viable 
metaphysics enabling us to recognize and interpret the “crack” in everything. And by “give us a 
way” I mean that he capacitates us for wonder because he does more than inform us about 
astonishment. His texts cannot just be read or gone over; they must be undergone. Having seen 
how this style of metaphysical reflection does not run afoul of our “Five Commandments,” the 
way is open to probing how a theologian might draw on Desmond’s metaxological philosophy as 
a resource for theological reflection. One might even dare to consider how metaxology can 
become, when approached as a form of spiritual exercise, the practice of a way of life. I think 
there is much exciting work to be done in developing Desmond’s thought in dialogue with 
thinkers such as Pierre Hadot, but such reflection would need a much longer treatment than 
allowable in a thesis.  
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